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Advisor: John R. Hibbing
Folk wisdom has long held that people become more conservative as they grow
older. The empirics behind this claim, however, are not definitive. Utilizing panel data
from the Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel study and a longitudinal sample of
Australian twins, my dissertation answers this question and many others as I examine
patterns of attitudinal stability and the direction of attitudinal change when it does occur.
These data allowed me to longitudinally track attitudinal change at the individual level. I
first uncovered latent classes defined by patterns of attitudinal stability across the
lifespan. The majority of people in these latent classes were defined by general patterns
of stability. Of those who did change their attitudes across the lifespan, most moved in a
conservative direction. However, there was still a significant group of people who were
defined by a pattern of liberal change. After ascertaining these latent classes, I then began
to uncover the reasons underlying these basic patterns of stability. I show attitudinal
stability is a somewhat heritable trait which can be explained by psychological
predispositions and sociological life events.
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Chapter 1: The Seeds of Change
1.1 Don’t Lose Your Dinosaur
The 2008 hit comedy Step Brothers hits its emotional crescendo at the Catalina
Wine Mixer. In the preceding moments leading to this climax, Brennan Huff and Dale
Doback, played by Will Ferrell and John C. Reilly, respectively, had spent their lives as
overgrown 40-year-old man-children whose parents recently married. Their follies
culminated in the destruction of the beloved sailboat owned by Robert Doback, Dale’s
father who was played by the inimitable Richard Jenkins. The destruction of the boat
causes a rift that tears this newly formed family apart and forces Dale and Brennan to act
their age and join the real world. Brennan gets a job at his brother’s helicopter leasing
company and is put in charge of the Catalina Wine Mixer, the biggest helicopter leasing
event in the Western Hemisphere. He brings the family back together, as he hired Dale’s
catering company and invited their parents to the event. In the culmination of this classic
piece of American cinema, Robert looks at his dispirited son and former step-son and is
crushed. He opens up to them:
“When I was a kid, when I was a little boy, I always
wanted to be a dinosaur. I wanted to be a Tyrannosaurus
Rex more than anything in the world. I made my arms short
and I roamed the backyard, I chased the neighborhood cats,
I growled and I roared. Everybody knew me and was afraid
of me. And one day my dad said, ‘Bobby, you are 17. It's
time to throw childish things aside,’ and I said, ‘Okay,
Pop.’ But he didn't really say that, he said, ‘Stop being a
fucking dinosaur and get a job.’ So, I thought, I'll be a
doctor for a little while, and then go back to that…the point
is, don’t lose your dinosaur."
This moment of the film is similar in many regards to the popular understanding of how
the aging process works. In our younger years, we are supposed to be filled with gleeful
abandon and fanciful notions, but as we grow older, we are expected to throw these
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youthful dalliances aside and develop a more conventional lifestyle. In short, we are
supposed to become more conservative.
The popular folk wisdom states that if you are not a liberal at 20, you have no
heart, but if you are not a conservative at 30, you have no brain. As we saw in 2016,
seemingly age-old attitudes that defined separation between the two parties evaporated
into thin air. Politically, 2016 was a strange year. The rise, within the ranks of a party
noted for its conservative orthodoxy, of an ideologically heterodox businessman and
reality television star was shocking in and of itself. His ascendancy to the presidency was
nearly Earth-shattering in its unexpectedness. Although the current Republican president
of the United States holds many conservative positions, he has also been unafraid to
explore abandoning central tenets of conservative trade policy by scrapping long-standing
free trade deals. His close relationship with Russia has caused many Republican voters to
develop friendlier attitudes toward Vladimir Putin and Russia more broadly.
Some in the media and elsewhere have attributed our president’s success in changing the
attitudes of the Republican to his ability to stoke the flames of racial and religious
animosity among an aging crowd of white voters. Perhaps our septuagenarian president
from New York City has tapped into an already natural inclination of voters to become
more conservative throughout time. Although many hold to this belief that says people
become more conservative as they grow older, the empirical support behind it is scant.
Indeed, an examination of the literature surrounding the direction of attitudinal change is
mixed, with some arguing that people become more liberal as they grow older and others
arguing people become more conservative. I will answer this question in my dissertation,
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but before I can answer this question I must also contend with the nature of attitudinal
change regardless of its direction.
There are a number of questions surrounding the nature of attitudinal change.
Since the early 00’s, there has been a mini-renaissance in the study of political attitudes
from a psychological perspective. Political science had long held that political attitudes at
the individual-level were unstable and unconstrained by one another (see Converse
1964). Yet, scholars working on the border of psychology and political science have
begun to reformulate our understanding of what political attitudes are. Jost et al. (2003)
laid the foundation for this renaissance when their meta-analytic study demonstrated the
wide-ranging psychological correlates of political attitudes. This study suggested
attitudes were a fundamental psychological. Subsequent work, such as that of Alford,
Funk, and Hibbing (2005), has repeatedly shown individual-level ideological orientation
to be influenced by genetically heritable factors (e.g. Hatemi et al. 2008; Settle et al.
2009; Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2012). Put together, these studies all present a
radically different interpretation of political attitudes than the dominant view within
political science, as they believe these attitudes to be a fundamental human trait which
should be relatively immutable.
The primary question at the heart of this dissertation is: How stable are political
attitudes over the lifespan? As this question is answered, however, a number of related
questions are answered along the way, as I explain individual-level variation in patterns
of attitudinal stability over the lifespan. Specifically, in the chapters of this dissertation, I
will focus on four major goals. First, I will describe the general patterns of attitudinal
change over the lifespan. In the process of describing these patterns, I will examine the
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existence and direction of attitudinal change over the lifespan. That is, do political
attitudes tend to change over the lifespan, and when they do change, do they shift in a
liberal or conservative direction? Second, I will determine the degree to which those
general patterns of attitudinal change are heritable traits. Here I will also explore various
psychological traits which may explain differences in the patterns of attitudinal change.
Third, I will identify the various factors which work to shift attitudes over the lifespan.
These factors will include psychological changes and major life events such as
socioeconomic mobility, changing peer influences, and acquiring new roles in life like
becoming a parent. Finally, I will examine the degree to which patterns of attitudinal
change are context dependent. That is, do different types of political attitudes display
different patterns of change over the lifespan?
From here, I will proceed as follows: The theory section will discuss four major
theories of political attitude change throughout the lifespan. These models are the lifelong
persistence model, the lifelong openness model, the impressionable years model, and the
running tally model. The strengths and weaknesses of these models will be discussed in
some detail. It will be argued that these theories are lacking as they provide answers—
some better than others—for whether or not attitudes do change and when they change,
but none of these theories can work to explain the direction of attitude change throughout
the lifespan. After this discussion, I explore potential ways in which recent advances in
political psychology might be able to provide us better answers about attitudinal stability
throughout the lifespan. I will discuss theoretical expectations regarding the existence and
pattern of attitudinal change throughout the lifespan. I will then propose four unique
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studies which will work to advance the overall level of understanding regarding political
attitudes throughout the lifespan.

1.2 Theories about Attitudinal Stability
Four models have dominated the study of political learning—a vast literature
dealing with not only attitudinal stability but with how individuals process and deal with
new political information and political shocks throughout the lifespan. In no particular
order, these models are the lifelong persistence model, the lifelong openness model, the
impressionable years model, and the running tally model. As these various models are
discussed, special care will be taken to mention how each model might answer the
question of the change of political attitudes.
Lifelong Persistence
The lifelong persistence model derives primarily from the work of Campbell et al.
(1960). As the name suggests, this model suggests that political attitudes, partisan
attitudes to be specific, are the result of socialization early in life and persist throughout
the lifespan of the individual. Regardless of new political information and political
shocks, attitudes will remain relatively constant. Although this model was primarily
devised as an explanation for partisan identification, lifelong persistence does provide
testable hypotheses regarding the existence and direction of attitudinal change. Followed
to its logical conclusion, the lifelong persistence model would expect little-to-no
attitudinal change; there should be no systematic shift from liberal to conservative
attitudes across the long term (or vice versa). This model of attitudinal stability is very
accurate regarding the attitudes of older people, but has weaknesses when trying to
explain younger people.
Lifelong Openness
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The inverse of the lifelong persistence model is the lifelong openness model,
which suggests that attitudes remain equally susceptible throughout the lifespan. This
model is most succinctly laid out by Franklin and Jackson (1983) and Franklin (1984),
who used it to explore the dynamics of partisan identification. They found that partisan
identification was an identity that was responsive to the ever-changing policy orientations
of the Democratic and Republican parties. Throughout the lifespan people should remain
open new political information and respond to political shocks. In short, individuals will
be susceptible to attitudinal change. This model is largely agnostic on the direction of
such change. Presumably, the direction of the change would be dependent on the context
of the political environment. For instance, if the prevailing political environment were
more supportive of the Democratic Party, we would expect leftward attitudinal change. If
the Republican Party were the more supported party, we would expect the direction of
attitudinal change to move right.
Impressionable Years
The impressionable years model of political learning incorporates elements of
both the persistence and openness models. Essentially, the impressionable years model
argues that young adults generally between the ages of 18 and 26 are susceptible to
attitudinal change as the openness model suggest. However, as these young adults grow
older, their attitudes crystalize and become more immune to new information and
political shocks as the persistence model suggests. Building the work Newcomb (1943)
and Newcomb et al. (1967) did with a panel of women who attended Bennington College
in the 1930s, it was found the attitudes of these women crystallized in early adulthood
and remained stable throughout the rest of their life (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991;
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Alwin and Krosnick 1991). Other work on political socialization and learning has
reached similar conclusions with perhaps one minor caveat. Some argue that while the
bulk of crystallization may occur in early adulthood, crystallization occurs throughout the
rest of life (Sears and Funk 1999). Work in this vein has even been categorized as a
separate model called the increasing persistence model.2 Studies using data from the
Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study typically report findings consistent
with the impressionable years or increasing persistence models (e.g. Jennings and Niemi
1981; Jennings and Markus 1984; Markus 1979; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Stoker and
Jennings 2008). In sum, the impressionable years model suggests people are amenable to
shifting their political attitudes and are most pliable in early adulthood (Dinas 2013).
Again, however, the model provides no theoretical expectation regarding the direction of
that change. Dinas (2013) has used this model to demonstrate that the political
environment is vital in determining the outcome of change, as he found young people
were more likely than older people to adjust their attitudes toward Richard Nixon
following the Watergate scandal.
Running Tally
The running tally model is a rational choice approach to political learning
primarily developed by Fiorina (1981) and expanded upon by Achen (1992) and Gerber
and Green (1998). This approach suggests that instead of having immovable attitudes
people routinely update their attitudes based on retrospective (Fiorina 1981; Gerber and
Green 1998) or prospective (Achen 1992) evaluations of the political environment.
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For a further explanation of the differences between the impressionable years and
increasing persistence models see Alwin and Krosnick 1991.
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Similar to the lifelong openness model (and, in a more limited sense, the impressionable
years model), the running tally model allows for attitudes to fluctuate throughout the
lifespan. Although the lifelong openness model and the running tally model have their
similarities, there is one major difference between them. The lifelong openness model
holds that attitudes are equally likely to shift through the lifespan. As such, prior attitudes
do not constrain the likelihood of shifting attitudes. The running tally model accounts for
a larger role of prior attitudes, as a person must accrue enough “tallies” against that prior
attitude before changing. Again, however, there is no consistent hypothesis on the
direction such change will take; the direction of any attitudinal change is assumed to be
almost solely a function of context and the political environment.

1.3 Integrating Individual Differences
Central to the previously discussed models of attitude change is a one-size-fits-all
approach to the study of attitude change. That is, general patterns of change should be
relatively invariable across individuals. Yet, the study of individual differences within
both political science and psychology has begun to explore the possibility that one-sizefits-all models are not ideal for understanding the complexities of human behavior. That
is, there may be one group of people which may display one pattern of change over their
lifespan while another group of people may display an entirely different pattern of
attitude change over their lifespan. Specifically, I posit that individual differences in
patterns of attitude change exist, and these differences are best understood from a
framework incorporating insights from developmental psychology, behavioral genetics,
and political science.
Currently, there are two major streams of thought regarding the nature of
attitudinal stability. The first is best exemplified by the work of Converse (1964) and
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others who dismiss the existence of ideology altogether because of observed instability
and lack of constraint in political attitudes. The second comes from the research
following the insights gleaned from Alford, Funk, and Hibbing’s (2005) article which
was among the first work to establish a heritable component to political ideology. This
line of work has established a convincing counterargument to Converse and others.
Instead of ideology being an ephemeral trait dependent on the capricious whims of time,
place, and mood, this group of scholars maintains that ideology is a biologically
predisposed trait which forms a central aspect of individual identity. As such, if this
proposition is correct, then ideology should be far more immutable than previous
research had suggested. Yet, this ongoing debate may be missing the forest for the trees,
as it disregards the reasonable hypothesis that both views may be partly correct. From the
standpoint of understanding the nature of individual differences, it is plausible to imagine
a reality where there are some who are predisposed towards attitudinal lability and others
who are predisposed towards attitudinal stability.
In terms of expectations for such a theory, Hatemi et al. (2009) explored the
degree to which additive genetic effects differed over the lifespan. Their findings were
suggestive of a general pattern similar to the impressionable years model. In their
analyses, they found the genetic effect on political orientation reported by Alford, Funk,
and Hibbing (2005) only begins to play a role for people once they reach the ages of 2125. Prior to that political orientations are largely explained by factors in the environment
such as familial socialization. I will go beyond these findings in my dissertation and
hopefully demonstrate that the process of attitudinal crystallization described in the
impressionable years model is in itself a product of additive genetic effects. As I will
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discuss later, the impressionable years model has a substantial literature to support its
general tenets. It may be that the impressionable years model is adept at capturing the
central tendency of attitudinal change through the lifespan, but a focus on individual
differences as they pertain to attitudinal change allows us to have a much clearer
understanding of these processes.
To assess the feasibility of such a theory, I will take an exploratory approach as I
figure out the nature of attitudinal stability. This exploratory approach will be constrained
by theoretical expectations derived from our understanding of psychological development
through the lifespan. My theoretical expectations will draw from a burgeoning literature
on the nature of personality change over the lifespan. The linkage between personality
traits and political attitudes has been well established (see Mondak 2010), and there is
some reason to expect changes in political orientation over the lifespan will track changes
in personality over the lifespan. The central finding in the personality over the lifespan
literature is that personality is a remarkably stable trait over the lifespan (Helson, Jones,
and Kwan 2002; McAdams and Olson 2010; Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer 2006).
Yet, this tendency towards stability is marked by noticeable patterns of change. These
patterns are detectable in terms of the timing of personality change and in terms of the
direction of personality change. Specifically, personality change tends to occur in early
adulthood, and if personality does change as people grow older they tend to become more
conscientious, socially dominant, and agreeable (Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer 2006)
while negativity bias tends to decrease as people grow older (Wood and Kisley 2006).
These patterns of change largely map onto our understanding of the nature of
attitude change over the lifespan. In terms of the timing of attitude change, most
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empirical evidence supports something like the aforementioned impressionable years
model. Just as the impressionable years model maintains that the probability of attitude
change is highest in young adulthood, the general consensus on personality change
argues the probability of personality change is highest during the same time with the
probability of change decreasing significantly after people turn 40 (Roberts, Walton, and
Viechtbauer 2006). The empirical evidence on the direction of attitude change over the
lifespan tends to be a little murkier, as some argue that people become more conservative
as they grow older (Cornelis et al. 2009; Franssen, Dhont, and Van Hiel 2012;
Kossowska, Jasko, and Bar-Tal 2012; Tilley and Evans 2014; Van Hiel and Brebels
2011; Wilson 1973) while others argue for a liberalizing effect of age (Dangelis, Hardy,
and Cutler 2007; Glenn 1974; Schwadel and Garneau 2014).
It is possible that this disconnect in the literature can be reconciled, as those who
believe age makes people more conservative tend to be focused on policy attitudes as the
outcome variable while those who argue the opposite tend focus on outgroup tolerance
attitudes as the outcome variable. The empirical evidence has presented a consistent
pattern in regard to this statement. Yet, contextualizing the direction of attitude change in
such a manner has not taken place. Therefore, there are many open questions pertaining
to this disconnect. Since we do not know who exactly is changing, we do not know if the
people who are becoming more conservative in their policy positions are also the same
people who are becoming more tolerant towards outgroups. If they are indeed the same
people, this raises interesting questions as to how the concurrence of these two patterns
occurs. If they are not the same people, then it raises interesting questions as to why some
people become more tolerant and others become more conservative. It is important to
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note that most studies up to this point have relied on cross-sectional data to answer these
questions. Although there are certain benefits to this kind of approach, cross-sectional
data cannot capture the within-person processes that produce these shifts through the
lifespan. As I will use panel data in my dissertation, I hope to answer these questions.
If policy attitudes and tolerance attitudes are separate, it should be possible to
reconcile these two arguments. Moreover, these separate patterns in attitude change may
be explained by known patterns of personality change. There are fairly well-established
relationships between conscientiousness and conservative policy attitudes (see Mondak
2010) as well as between social dominance and conservative policy attitudes (see Pratto
et al. 1994). Given the increase of conscientiousness and social dominance over the
lifespan, it is not surprising then to see a corresponding shift in conservative policy
attitudes. In addition to the increases in conscientiousness and social dominance, there is
also an increase in agreeableness and a decrease in negativity bias as people grow older.
There has been no steady relationship between agreeableness and conservative policy
attitudes (Gerber et al. 2010), but there is a demonstrable relationship between
agreeableness and attitudes toward outgroups. Negativity bias has also been linked to
ideology (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014). Importantly, negativity bias tends to be
most closely associated with conservative social policy attitudes (see Oxley et al. 2008;
Smith et al. 2011), and there is no consistent link between negativity bias and
conservative economic policy attitudes (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014). These
predispositional changes could be an explanation for observed patterns of increased
tolerance over the lifespan. These personality changes may not be the only force
underlying this apparent divide between the stability patterns of tolerance items and the
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stability patterns of issue attitudes, but it is one theoretical possibility underlying these
differences.
Based on the existing evidence in the study of personality over the lifespan, my
theoretical expectations are as follows. The dominant pattern of attitude change over the
lifespan will be stability, but when attitudes do change the nature of the change will be
gradual, and the direction of that change will be dependent on the specific domain of the
attitude. Attitudes on policy will tend to change in a conservative direction while attitudes
toward social tolerance will tend to change in a liberal direction. Beyond these gradual
and predictable changes, however, there is evidence to suggest traumatic or unexpected
life events, as well as role changes through the lifespan, may also shape the degree to
which people change over their lifespans.
Evidence from the frontiers of the biological examination of lifespan development
points to the ability of traumatic and stressful events to fundamentally alter the structures
and functions of the brain (Kolassa and Elbert 2007). Although much of this work centers
on the kinds of severe traumatic events which lead to clinically diagnosable disorders
such as post-traumatic stress disorder, there is some evidence to suggest major events that
are not readily classified as traumatic events may induce attitude change among some
people. In an examination of how people processed the Watergate scandal, Dinas (2013)
found that the scandal had a lasting effect on the political outlooks of young people who
lived through the event. Findings like these make sense when thought of as an analogue
to basic physics. Given that the central tendency in personality and political attitude
change over is stability marked by gradual changes, it is presumed that simple inertia
explains a good deal of attitudes over the lifespan. Inertia describes a process by which an
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object will maintain constant velocity unless it is acted upon by an unbalanced force
(Newton 1687). If the trajectory of attitudes is the object in this instance, then these kinds
of unexpected life events act as the unbalanced force which disrupts the constant velocity
of those attitudes.
The Plan of Action
Taken together, my four major expectations are outlined above. To reiterate, the
expectations are as follows:
1. The typical pattern of attitudinal stability over the lifespan will be stasis.
2. Some will be predisposed towards attitudinal stability while others will be
predisposed towards attitudinal lability.
3. Regardless of predisposed tendencies towards stability or lability, change
will occur as the result of psychological predispositions, major life events,
and as a byproduct of the aging process.
4. The direction of attitudinal change will be predictable and contextdependent.
In the empirical chapters of this dissertation I will work to test the limits of these
expectations. From here, I will outline the structure of this dissertation, taking special
care to discuss the research strategies I employ throughout.

1.4 Chapter 2
The second chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to the descriptive
understanding of attitudinal changes over the lifespan. Using longitudinal data, I will
establish the general patterns of attitudinal change over the lifespan. Here, I will lay the
empirical foundation for the dissertation. Specifically, I used a combination of descriptive
statistics and growth-mixture modeling, and I addressed the first theoretical expectation
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of this dissertation by establishing patterns of attitudinal stability and showing patterns of
attitudinal stability can be treated as individual differences.
The findings of this chapter run counter to each of the four existing theories of
attitudinal change. Each of those theories argues for a uniform pattern of attitudinal
change. By taking the focus away from the central tendency of attitudinal change, I
present a way of examining the degree to which differing patterns of change exist. By
identifying people with these differing patterns of change, it will be possible to better
understand the nature of attitudinal change. Understanding this nature is important from
theoretical and applied standpoints. At a theoretical level, a fuller understanding of
attitude change helps to know about the nature of ideological orientations and sheds light
on whether we should treat these attitudes as stable traits or labile states. From an applied
level, this approach could help to identify people who are open to shifting their political
beliefs and could help to devise strategies of make political appeals to differing groups of
people.
The data utilized for this chapter came from two pre-existing datasets. The first
dataset is the Michigan Youth-Parent Panel Socialization Study (hereafter, MSS;
Jennings, Markus, Niemi, and Stoker 2005). This longitudinal dataset began in 1965 as a
study of high school seniors and their parents. Those high school seniors were then
recontacted in 1973, 1982, and 1997 when the participants would have been 26, 35, and
50 years-old, respectively. This dataset is one of the few longitudinal datasets in political
science which include such a broad swath of the lifespan, affording the ability to track the
individuals from young adulthood to middle age. The second dataset came from the
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American National Election Study (ANES). This dataset is not longitudinal in nature.
Rather it is a cross-sectional dataset, and it will act as an important validity check.
The analytical strategy for this chapter will be two-fold. The first part will be a
fairly simplistic breakdown of the basic patterns of political attitudes over the lifespan. In
this section of the chapter, I will be focused on presenting the raw patterns of attitudes by
age, as well as the raw patterns of attitudinal change by age. A variety of attitudes will be
assessed in this part of the chapter. Ideological identification, as measured by the
common seven-point scale ranging from “Strongly Liberal” to “Strongly Conservative”,
will be assessed, along with party identification and individual issue attitudes. These
various items will be used so the gamut of political attitudes can be assessed. The
individual issue attitudes will be selected to tease apart economic political attitudes from
social political attitudes.
The second part of this chapter’s research design will focus on using statistical
techniques which will allow for the identification of differing patterns of change among
people. Growth mixture modeling (GMM) will be the first such technique. GMM is a
method which allows for identifying unobserved subpopulations in longitudinal datasets
based on differences in change over time between these subpopulations (Ram and Grimm
2009). Simply put, this method will be able to place people into groups based on their
patterns of change over time. So, people who are attitudinally stable over the lifespan can
be differentiated from people who are attitudinally labile over the span. Of those who are
attitudinally labile, it will be possible to identify those who become more liberal and
those who become more conservative. Like the first part of the research design, these
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analyses will focus on a variety of attitudes so it is possible to discern how these patterns
might change based on the context of issue attitudes.

1.5 Chapter 3
Once the basic patterns of attitudinal change have been established, the question
becomes why do some people change over time while others do not? I begin to answer
this question in Chapter 3. In this chapter I will focus on establishing the biological roots
to these differences. Existing theories argue the sources of attitudinal change are purely
environmental effects, either via socialization or life events. It is my goal in this chapter
to demonstrate that some people are more prone to attitudinal lability as a direct product
of genetic predispositions.
Understanding the degree to which attitudinal stability is a product of nature
and/or nurture is vital to understanding attitudinal stability as a whole. Heritability
analyses partitioned the variance associated with attitudinal stability into three
components—additive genetic effects, shared environmental effects, and unshared
environmental effects. These analyses provided a much clearer picture as to where we
can find the sources of attitudinal stability.
The data for this chapter came from a sample of Australian twins who were
contacted at two time points roughly 18-24 months apart. Between the years 2007 and
2009, data were collected from 250 complete twin pairs in Australia. At that time, a
number of political attitude questions were asked in the form of the Wilson-Patterson
battery (Wilson and Patterson 1968), along with a number of questions pertaining to
personality traits including a 44-item assessment of the Big 5. These data compose Wave
I. Following that, 402 twins from Wave I were successfully recontacted between the
years 2009 and 2011, and those twins were asked the same questions.
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The research design takes advantage of the genetic information inherent to twin
datasets. As the sample includes both monozygotic twins who are 100 percent genetically
identical and dizygotic twins who are 50 percent genetically identical, it is possible to
compare the rate of similarity in monozygotic twin pairs with the rate of similarity in
dizygotic twin pairs to estimate the degree to which the rate of similarity is a product of
additive genetic effects and/or a product of shared or unshared environmental effects.
This classic twin design has been utilized for decades to ascertain the degree to which
traits (or, in the parlance of behavioral genetics, phenotypes) are genetically heritable.
For the purposes of this chapter, the phenotypes of primary interest are attitudinal
stability and the direction of attitudinal change. To capture these phenotypes, I took the
absolute and real values of the differences between the Wilson-Patterson items measured
in Wave I from those measured in Wave II. This process was completed with the full
Wilson-Patterson scale, two reduced Wilson-Patterson scales (one to capture social
attitudes and another to capture economic attitudes), and for each individual WilsonPatterson item. Although the direction of ideology has been shown to be heritable (see
Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005), the absolute value of change was assessed, as I am not
so much concerned about the direction of attitudinal change so much as I am interested in
the existence of attitudinal change. After these change variables were created, structural
equation model (SEM) models were utilized to ascertain the degree to which the variation
in these traits is attributable to genetic or environmental effects. Although there are a few
methods to calculate these estimates, SEM was used as it provides error estimates (unlike
the simpler Falconer Method) and allows for the straightforward comparison of
competing models (unlike utilizing a regression-based approach).
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1.6 Chapters 4 and 5
Chapters 2 and 3 answer many important questions pertaining to the nature of
attitudinal stability. While Chapter 2 addresses the patterns of attitudinal stability and
Chapter 3 addresses the biological sources of attitudinal stability, Chapters 4 and 5 focus
on identifying the sources of attitudinal stability and directionality. Using both previously
discussed longitudinal datasets, these chapters tested the degree to which personality and
life events shape the propensity to be attitudinally stable through the lifespan. Chapter 4
focuses on the role of personality, and Chapter 5 focuses on the role of sociological life
events.
Each dataset provides its own unique advantages to overcome disadvantages
inherent to the other dataset. In Chapter 4 I examine the Australian twin dataset which
cannot adequately address the effects of life events over a long period of time, but it is
rich with personality-related variables and can test the degree to which shifts in
personality shape the directionality of attitudinal change. In Chapter 5 I return to the MSS
dataset which has the benefits of capturing numerous life events over a long period time,
but it does a poor job assessing the personality of its subjects.
Using the Australian twins dataset in Chapter 4, I examined the degree to which
changes in personality influence the direction of attitudinal change. Here it is possible to
capture the influence of Big Five personality traits as well as interesting measures of
empathy such as the Reading of the Mind in the Eyes Task (RME) and the Empathy
Quotient (EQ). The RME displays images of expressive eyes and asks participants to
classify the expression in those eyes. People who score high on this task can be said to be
more empathic (at least in this one facet of empathy) than those who score lower on this
task. Here I calculated a change score for a variety of political attitudes, and with an OLS
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regression, use these personality variables as the independent variables used to predict
change.
To assess the degree to which life events affect the propensity for attitudinal
lability in Chapter 5, I utilized the MSS dataset from Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 I placed
people into groups based on their propensity for attitudinal lability. There were two
different groups based on the directionality of attitudinal instability, and three groups
based on patterns of attitudinal stability. In the first analyses, I focus on only two groups:
the attitudinally stable and the attitudinally labile (regardless of direction). Using a
logistic regression approach, I examine group membership as a function of life events and
some psychological traits. I then split the groups into three: those who are attitudinally
stable, those who become more conservative, and those who become more liberal. Using
logistic models, I was able examine the degree to which certain life events predict the
probability of being in one of these three groups.

1.7 What is to Come?
Throughout the analyses in this dissertation a common theme emerges. Patterns of
attitudinal stability, while defined generally by a pattern of stasis, vary across individuals.
The direction of attitudinal change appears to be in line with the folk wisdom. Of the
small people who do change their attitudes, the largest tendency is a move towards more
conservative political attitudes. However, there is also a smaller group of people who
move in a liberal direction. Some people do seem more predisposed to lability than
others, and some people seem more predisposed to move in conservative or liberal
direction. The likelihood of changed attitudes and the direction of changed attitudes are
influenced by several effects rooted in biology, psychology, and the environment. In the
end, most people do not seem to lose their dinosaur as they grow older.

21

Chapter 2: Establishing Patterns of Attitudinal Change
2.1 Introduction
George Babbitt, the eponymous protagonist of Sinclair Lewis’ 1922 novel
Babbitt, is an inherently conservative man who leaves behind the conformity of his
Midwestern life to experience a nonconformist, socially liberal lifestyle that includes
dabbling in leftist politics. The time he spends with the socially rebellious crowd in his
hometown alienates him from his family and friends. Eventually, as his wife falls ill,
Babbitt realizes he finds this new life untenable, and he re-embraces the conservative life
he left behind. Although he consciously chooses a conservative life, he retains a
sympathy for non-conformity. At the end of the novel, George’s son Ted and the
neighbors’ daughter scandalously elope after a party and George’s wife and friends
vociferously denounce their behavior. George, in contrast, tells his son he approves of
the marriage, as George believes it best that his son has chosen to forgo the conformity
George himself could not fully leave behind.
Lewis’ examination of the political psychology of one (fictional) man reflects the
central research questions this chapter seeks to address. First, do people, as folk wisdom
suggests, become more conservative as they grow older? Second, if political attitudes do
change across the lifespan, what drives this what drives the attitudinal change? Lewis
comes down firmly on the side of conventional wisdom’s answer to the first question;
being politically liberal is a young person’s game, and as we grow older, more sober, and
more mature we inevitably move toward the stability and comfort of tradition and
defense of the status quo that conservatism represents. While Lewis makes a convincing
fictional case for this political evolution, the empirical evidence backing this story is
mixed. Some studies suggest that people do indeed become more conservative as they get
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older (Cornelis et al. 2009; Wilson 1973), while others suggest that political orientations
stay fairly stable, or even become more liberal as people grow older (Alwin, Cohen, and
Newcomb 1991, Jennings and Niemi 1981, Dangelis, Hardy, and Cutler 2007). Below I
try to bring some clarity to the contradictory answers to this first question by examining
shifts in self-reported ideology in a longitudinal study that covers a 24-year-long span.
Using data from the Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study, I will be able to
explore this question by looking at the exact same population as they age from 26 years
old in 1973 to 50 years old in 1997.
The second question is perhaps of more importance. While there has been
considerable attention paid to the question of stability in political attitudes across the
lifespan, there has been surprisingly little empirical investigation of individual-level
variation in long-term shifts in political attitudes. Indeed, if anything political science
research has tended to treat such variation as evidence for the existence of non-attitudes
rather than trying to identify potential systematic causes of this variation (e.g. Converse
1964). Below I seek to identify covariates of attitudinal change across the span of
adulthood in an attempt to identify underlying causes of this variation.
To provide a brief roadmap of what is to follow, I will first discuss the four
dominant models of attitudinal stability in the extant literature. As stated previously, most
of these models suggest attitudes should remain fairly stable (with notable caveats)
throughout the lifespan. I add to the literature by suggesting patterns of attitudinal change
ought to be treated as an individual difference. After this discussion, I will delve into the
small literature that pertains to the direction of attitudinal change throughout life, and I
will then explore potential explanations for attitudinal change. In brief, the results suggest
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that political attitudes, as most models suggest, are stable over the long-term. Yet I also
find that a significant number of people do change their ideological orientation
throughout life, and these shifts are not uniform across the ideological spectrum. Liberals
are more likely to become conservatives than vice versa, suggesting there may be some
empirical basis to folk wisdom, and these results suggest several reasons why this is the
case.

2.2 Background and Hypotheses
When considering the general direction of attitudinal change throughout the
lifespan, there are four possibilities to encounter. First, we might see a general trend
toward conservatism as people grow older. Second, we might see the opposite and
observe a shift toward liberalism. The third possibility is that we will not see change in
either direction. Although change may exist, some people may become more
conservative, others more liberal, and others may not experience any change. The net
result of this divergent pattern of change would be the observation of attitudinal change at
the individual level but with no observable change in the direction of those attitudes in
the aggregate. The fourth possibility, consistent with the lifelong persistence model,
would suggest attitudinal change is extremely rare; therefore, there is no attitudinal shift
toward any one direction. It is the first two possibilities that suggest systematic attitudinal
shifts and are thus most relevant to a central question addressed in this dissertation, i.e.
investigating what systematically drives attitudinal changes if such change does indeed
occur.
There is a fair amount of empirical evidence to suggest that people do become
more conservative as they get older with much of this work done in social psychology
(e.g. Cornelis et al. 2009; Franssen, Dhont, and Van Hiel 2012; Grant et al. 2001;
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Kossowska, Jasko, and Bar-Tal 2012; Tilley and Evans 2014; Van Hiel and Brebels
2011; Wilson 1973). Common to these studies is the idea that ideology is largely an
independent or dependent facet of personality. As such, if we take ideology to be
dependent on other features of personality, then changes in personality through the
lifespan should lead to changes in ideology. The direction of personality changes
common to aging tends to have a positive relationship with political conservatism
(Cornelis et al. 2009). Correlational studies have shown that as people grow older, they
tend to have higher needs for closure (Kossowska, Jasko, and Bar-Tal 2012; Van Hiel
and Brebels 2011). Indeed, this work tends to find that these personality changes mediate
the relationship between conservatism and age. All of this is consistent with the
directional hypotheses of the biological predispositions model but contradicts the other
four models discussed earlier, at least in the sense that attitudinal change is as much a
product of variation in individual-level traits as the context of a particular political
environment.
Though social psychology research tends to find considerable support for a
directional shift rightward across the lifespan, some work runs directly counter to this
claim. Some argue that as people grow older, they become more tolerant (Glenn 1974;
Dangelis, Hardy, and Cutler 2007; Schwadel and Garneau 2014). These findings suggest
a liberalizing effect of age rather than a conservatizing effect of age. The question
becomes whether or not these findings are the result of how the question is being studied.
Political tolerance is likely related to overall political ideology, but it is easy to imagine a
person becoming more tolerant of groups like the LGBT community while still
maintaining or generating an overall conservative worldview.
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The hypotheses for this chapter are derived from the first major theoretical
expectation of the dissertation: the most common pattern of attitudinal change through
the lifespan will be a pattern of stasis. However, for those who do change, there are also
expectations regarding the direction of change.
H1: Patterns of attitudinal stability will be more common than patterns of attitudinal
lability.
H2: Of those who are attitudinally labile, the direction of change will be more likely to be
in a conservative direction.
H3: The direction of attitudinal change for outgroup tolerance will be in a liberal
direction.

2.3 Data and Methods
The data used for the analyses were drawn from the Michigan Youth-Parent Panel
Socialization Study (hereafter, MSS; Jennings, Markus, Niemi, and Stoker 2005). These
data have been described in great detail in other work (see Jennings and Niemi 1981), but
they provide a unique opportunity to study the dynamics of political attitudes throughout
the adult life. The MSS was initiated by surveying high school seniors and their parents
in 1965. The study then re-interviewed those same people in 1973 and 1982. In 1997 the
researchers returned to the original youth cohort and interviewed them and their children.
For the purposes of this part of my study, I will examine the ideological selfidentification of that original youth cohort from 1973 to 1997.3 The longitudinal nature of
this dataset provides a number of unique advantages for answering the question at hand.
The years of life covered in 1973, 1982, and 1997 (26, 35, 50) also allow us to examine
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Data on self-reported ideology were unavailable for the 1965 wave of the panel.
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sources of attitudinal change in years often thought to be relatively immune from change
as Jennings and Niemi argue.
Most studies that attempt to answer the question of whether or not people become
more conservative as they grow older rely on cohort analyses derived from crosssectional data. There are some advantages to that approach, but it typically relies on the
assumption that the only causes of attitudinal change within a cohort are due to intracohort aging and learning and not attrition from the cohort (Dangelis, Hardy, and Cutler
2007). The assumption of no attrition would be acceptable if there were no systematic
differences in the mortality rates of liberals and conservatives but recent evidence
suggests there are systematic differences in mortality rates for liberals and conservatives
(see Pabayo, Kawachi, and Muenni 2015; Subramanian et al. 2009; Subramanian et al.
2010). Though attrition did occur throughout the MSS, when examining change at the
individual level, it can be assured that attrition is not confounding those individual level
changes. Regardless of attrition longitudinal designs are ideal for answering the questions
I am asking. These data allow me to track changes within individual people. Thus, I am
spared inferential issues inherent to studies examining these questions through crosssectional approaches.
For the first set of analyses, I compared the MSS dataset with three ANES
subsamples. I examined the degree to which participants in the MSS and the ANES
changed across time on party identification, ideology, attitudes on women’s rights, and
attitudes on minority assistance. These four positions were examined for two reasons.
First, by examining patterns of change in not only ideology, but with another
identification measure and two attitudinal measures, I can see if the pattern of change in
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ideology is similar to other kinds of political changes. Second, I was able to match each
of these four measures with equivalent ANES measures observed at the same time point
as the MSS. Three sets of ANES data are used. The first is an average of all ANES
participants for a given year, and the second is an average of a subset of ANES
participants in the same age cohort as the MSS cohort. Finally, the third measure is an
average of a subset of ANES based on the initial age of MSS dataset. For instance, three
of the analyses are based on data which was initially collected when the MSS participants
were roughly 26 years old. As such, I took the average of all ANES participants between
the ages of 26 and 34 for the initial time point and each subsequent time point. After
using the ANES data to disentangle attitudinal change in the aggregate, I delve deeper
into the MSS data to examine individual patterns of attitudinal change.

2.4 Ideological Self-Report in the Aggregate
Figure 1 tracks the mean value of party identification, ideology, attitudes on
women’s rights, and attitudes on minority assistance along various time points for two
samples.4 The first line in each graph represents the mean of all 935 individuals in the
MSS, the second line represents the mean of all respondents in the ANES in the year
prior to data collection for the MSS, the third line represents the mean of those in the
ANES data who were in the same age cohort as the MSS cohort, and the final line
represents the mean of those in the ANES who were in the initial age group of the MSS
cohort.5 The three sets of ANES data can be used to parse out any possible aggregate
effects of age, period, and cohort. In particular, the full ANES dataset allows me to

For all measures, “don’t know” responses were recoded into the middle category. Analyses showed that
this recoding did not significantly alter the findings.
5
1982 is the only time point where the samples were collected in exactly the same year.
4
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establish what the general pattern of attitudes was across American society during the
relevant timeframe.
If the MSS data moves in synch with the full ANES data, then any change in the
MSS dataset can be attributed to the effects of societal pressure caused by the particular
period of time these data were collected. The other two sets work to establish any
possible effects of cohort and age. The ANES Cohort label identifies those in the ANES
dataset who were in the same age cohort as the MSS cohort at any given time. This set of
data provides two advantages. First, it provides a validity check on the MSS cohort data,
as a large divergence between the two datasets might suggest an issue regarding the
external validity of the MSS data. Second, patterns of change between these two datasets
can indicate generational effects. Finally, by utilizing a subset that represents the age
group of the MSS cohort at the initial time point, it is possible to tease out some possible
effects of age. The ANES Age subset should be fairly similar to the MSS cohort at the
initial time point. Any divergence between the two datasets after that initial time point
may indicate differences based on age.
For example, in the top left corner of Figure 1 the aggregate patterns of change for
party identification can be seen. Of the four items reported in this figure, party
identification is the only item for which there is data for each of the four time points
covered in the MSS data. Compared to the other three sets of data, the MSS cohort is
markedly more Democratic from 1973 onward even though they started out as slightly
more Republican in 1965. In 1965 the mean party identification score of those in the
MSS (M = 3.48, SD = 1.94) was significantly more Republican than the party
identification scores for the full ANES (M = 3.255, SD =3 .255, t(2100.01) = 2.69, p <
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.01)6, as well as their age cohort in the ANES (M = 2.97, SD = 1.80, t(155.51) = 2.87, p <
.01).
The largest divergence between the MSS cohort and the ANES comes at the 1973
time point. The MSS cohort went from being significantly more Republican than the
ANES groups in 1965 to being far more Democratic. In 1973 the MSS (M = 2.85, SD =
1.61) was more Democratic the whole ANES sample (M = 3.62, SD = 1.97, t(1713.24) =
11.41, p < .001), their ANES age cohort (M = 3.72, SD = 1.76, t(1162.77) = 9.44, p <
.001), and the younger 18-26 age ANES cohort (M = 3.53, SD = 1.64, t(943.13) = 7.20, p
< .001). A plausible hypothesis for the divergence actually supports a period effect based
on slight differences in the timing of the ANES and MSS studies. The ANES data were
collected in 1972 compared to 1973 for the MSS data. The Watergate effect may explain
why the MSS cohort took such a turn toward the Democratic Party at this time. Dinas
(2013) has shown that younger people during this time were more responsive to the
Watergate scandal and more likely to change their attitudes as a result.
Lending further credence to this idea is the fact that the MSS cohort became more
similar with their age cohort in later years. In 1982 the MSS cohort (M = 3.21, SD =
1.85) was similar to their age cohort (M = 3.42, SD = 1.96, t(403.71) = 1.52, p = .13), and
the MSS cohort (M = 3.45, SD = 1.84) was also similar, albeit still slightly more
Democratic than their age cohort in 1997 (M = 3.73, SD = 2.13, t(412.17) = 7.20, p =
.06). This increase in similarity resulted from the MSS cohort becoming more Republican
between 1973 (M = 2.85, SD = 1.61) and 1982 (M = 3.21, SD = 1.85, t(1679.51) = 4.27,
p < .001) and their ANES age cohort becoming more Democratic between 1973 (M =
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All t-tests performed from here on are two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variances. Degrees of freedom
reported are Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom.
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3.72, SD = 1.76) and 1982 (M = 3.42, SD = 1.96, t(449.02) = 2.10, p = .04). This pattern
is consistent with a short-term shock like the Watergate scandal leaving an indelible
impression on younger Americans. Importantly, no grand conclusions can be made
regarding the conservatizing effect of age as 18-25-year-olds were more Republican in
1982 (M = 3.72, SD = 1.80) than the MSS (M = 3.21, SD = 1.85, t(304.41) = 3.56, p <
.001), full ANES (M = 3.46, SD = 2.03, t(276.17) = 1.87, p = .06), and the ANES cohort
matched with the MSS (M = 3.42, SD = 1.96, t(443.20) = 1.68, p = .09). Given these
results, aging does not necessarily make people more conservative, and it is not
necessarily true that younger generations are more liberal than older generations.
Examining the patterns of change between 1973 and 1997 for the ideological
identification and minority assistance also does not provide strong evidence for a
conservatizing effect of age. With regards to ideology which can be found in the upper
right-hand corner of Figure 1, the MSS cohort does move in a more conservative
direction between 1973 (M = 3.85, SD = 1.36) and 1982 (M = 4.29, SD = 1.39,
t(1666.95) = 6.74, p < .001) while remaining stable between 1982 and 1997 (M = 4.33,
SD = 1.29, t(1707.70) = 0.49, p = .63). A similar pattern is seen with regards to the MSS
cohort on the item pertaining to government assistance for minorities between 1973 (M =
3.80, SD = 1.71) and 1982 (M = 4.49, SD = 1.57, t(1789.10) = 9.03, p < .001) and 1982
and 1997 (M = 4.52, SD = 1.48, t(1822.51) = 0.39, p = .70).
Given the remarkable amount of synchronicity between all four sets of data on
these issues, it is difficult to say the conservative leap between 1973 and 1982 for the
MSS cohort was the result of aging, as during this time those younger than MSS cohort
moved in similar directions. In fact, by 1997 18-25-year-olds (M = 4.92, SD = 1.65) were
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more conservative than the MSS cohort (M = 4.52, SD = 1.48, t(425.18) = 3.65, p < .001)
on the issue of minority assistance. Additionally, this same 18-25-year-old ANES cohort
was slightly more liberal (M = 4.15, SD = 1.43) than the MSS cohort in regards to
ideological identification in 1997 (M = 4.33, SD = 1.29, t(348.22) = 1.80, p = .07). This
mixed evidence does not paint a convincing argument for the existence of a
conservatizing effect of age separate from national trends. However, given the
remarkable stability within the MSS cohort, it does seem that attitudes remain fairly
stable, though when attitudes are changing in this cohort, the changes tend to be in a
conservative direction.
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The issue of women’s equality found in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 1
presents a different pattern than is found with the other three items, and these findings
certainly run counter to the argument that aging leads to more conservative attitudes. In
1973 the MSS cohort (M = 2.99, SD = 1.94) was more liberal than the full ANES (M =
3.51, SD = 2.27, t(1891.64) = 6.65, p < .001) and their age cohort in the ANES (M =
3.44, SD = 2.25, t(1042.74) = 3.99, p < .001), but by 1997 the MSS cohort (M = 1.93, SD
= 1.36) was much closer to the full ANES (M = 2.24, SD = 1.65, t(2238.14) = 5.11, p <
.001), their ANES age cohort (M = 2.06, SD = 1.41, t(419.28) = 1.28, p = .20), and 1825-year-olds (M = 1.91, SD = 1.47, t(453.45) = 0.30, p = .76). There is a clear pattern of
liberalized attitudes among the MSS cohort when their attitudes in 1973 (M = 2.99, SD =
1.94) are compared with their attitudes in 1982 (M = 2.20, SD = 1.59, t(1771.5) = 9.60, p
< .001) and their attitudes in 1982 are compared with their attitudes in 1997 (M = 1.93,
SD = 1.36, t(1801.35) = 3.76, p < .001). These results lend credence to the idea attitude
change through the lifespan is not solely a conservatizing process, and taken with the
other three graphs in Figure 1 it is evident that there needs to be a more nuanced answer
to the question of how attitudes change throughout the lifespan.

2.5 Moving to the Individual Level
Descriptive statistics can be misleading, and descriptive statistics in the aggregate
can be even more so. However, before delving into more rigorous analyses, I will
examine the individual-level patterns of change for my primary variable of interest—
ideology—over the three time points in the panel. I broke the seven-point scale of
ideology into a three-point scale where liberals, including weak liberals, were one
category, moderates were one category, and conservatives, including weak conservatives,
were another category. I did this to identify people who completely changed the
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ideological label they assigned to themselves. In each table I utilize self-reported
ideology in 1973 as the baseline and track its change between 1973 and 1982 along with
the change between 1982 and 1997 before showing the overall level of change between
1973 and 1997.
Table 1 tracks the patterns of attitudinal change for members of the MSS cohort
who described themselves as liberal in 1973. These self-identified liberals have a
noticeable pattern of attitudinal instability over this 24-year span thou, by 1997, well over
half of this group no longer described themselves as liberal. In other words, though the
greatest tendency was to remain liberal, nearly 34 percent described themselves as
conservatives, and 22 percent described themselves as moderate a quarter of a century on.
There does appear to be some evidence that the rate of stability increased as the cohort
got older but attitudinal change was still common, as nearly 56 percent changed between
the ages of 26 and 35 while 40 percent changed between the ages of 35 and 50. These
findings demonstrate two things. First, some change was in evidence for self-described
liberals and, while the rate of change slowed as they got older, the possibility of change
never disappeared. Second, this was not a case of liberals reclassifying themselves as
moderates. Instead, the greatest tendency of those who did change was to describe
themselves as conservative.
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In Table 2 patterns of attitudinal change for people who in 1973 self-identified as
moderates are shown. Like self-identified liberals, there is a pattern of a certain amount
of instability, but this instability is not greater than the instability seen with the liberals.
In fact, 48 percent of self-identified moderates in 1973 still identified as moderate in
1997. Compared with the 44 percent of liberals who remained liberal, it is difficult to say
the patterns are all that different between these two groups. The rate of change also
slowed for this group, as 45 percent changed between 1973 and 1982 compared to the 35
percent who changed between 1982 and 1997. Furthermore, of the 52 percent of selfidentified moderates who went on to identify as liberal or conservative, the split was not
even between those two groups. 39 percent of self-identified moderates went on to
identify as conservative, while only 13 percent went on to identify as liberal. Much like
the group of liberals, moderates demonstrated a modest amount of change over 24 years,
and of those who did change, the change was typically a rightward shift in orientation.
Very few moderates became liberal in that timeframe. In all, this finding fits the general
hypothesis that states stability is the norm and change tends to occur in a conservative
direction.
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The patterns of attitudinal change of people who identified as conservative in
1973 are displayed in Table 3. If the patterns of liberals and moderates are notable for a
certain amount of instability, the pattern for conservatives is remarkable for its stability.
66 percent of people who identified as conservative in 1973 still identified as
conservative in 1997. This pattern of stability remains virtually identical in the periods
between 1973-1982 and 1982-1997 at 35.72 and 36.61 percent, respectively. Of the little
change that occurred, there was a greater tendency for conservatives to reclassify
themselves as moderate (19 percent) than liberal (14 percent). It appears as though there
is something about these people who identified themselves as conservative that led them
to have a greater resistance to change. Indeed, these findings bolster arguments from
those who find conservatives tend to be more rigid (e.g. Jost et al. 2003). In all, these
descriptive findings support the idea that when people undergo attitudinal changes they
have a tendency to become more conservative, or, at the very least, they have a tendency
to be more likely to describe themselves as conservatives. However, the greatest tendency
for all members of the cohort was not to become more conservative. The tendency of the
cohort was to essentially stick with their ideological label over that 24-year span. 51
percent of the cohort did so.
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2.6 Identifying Individual Differences in Patterns of Change
The previous two sets of analyses have established the need for a more
individualized approach to understanding attitudinal change over the lifespan. In the first
set, which examined the aggregate patterns of change in the MSS cohort compared with
those from the ANES, there was no clear pattern of attitudinal change as it pertained to
age. Within the MSS data, there was marked stability, but the direction of any extant
change could be conservative or liberal depending on the item. Compared with younger
generations, the MSS cohort was either the same, more conservative, or more liberal than
the younger cohorts. The next set of analyses demonstrates clear patterns of stability and
direction in regards to ideological identification among the MSS cohort. These data show
a strong propensity for stability, but most change that did occur was in a conservative
direction. Regardless of modality, there were also a number of people who changed in
other directions. Treating attitudinal stability as an individual difference, therefore, seems
warranted given these basic patterns of data.
This next step works to identify groups of people based on their patterns of
attitudinal change over time. In particular, I utilize growth-mixture modeling to examine
patterns of change over eleven attitudes collected in the MSS data set. Growth-mixture
modeling allows for the identification of latent classes based on patterns found in
repeated measures (Ram and Grimm 2009). As each of the eleven items was measured
repeatedly in the MSS, it is possible to use growth-mixture modeling to identify patterns
regarding both attitude stability and the direction of attitudinal change. I ran the analyses
with MPlus version 7.1 (Muthén and Muthén 2014). This approach is preferable for
attempting to identify individual differences.
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Although growth-mixture modeling can be an exploratory exercise, I took a
confirmatory analytical approach. With this approach, I will begin with the hypothesis
that there are five general patterns of change to be expected. The first three patterns are
patterns of stability. Namely, I expect there to be people who start off conservative and
remain conservative, people who start off moderate and remain moderate, and people
who start off liberal and remain liberal. The last two patterns are patterns of lability.
Specifically, these patterns include people who change in a conservative direction and
people who change in a liberal direction. It is possible that more categories exist beyond
these five groups, but in terms of theoretical understanding they would not add much. For
instance, allowing for a sixth group might simply separate out the group of people who
become more conservative into two categories with one group representing those who
became more conservative than the other group. This approach allows us to discern these
groups with a statistical rigor not possible with other approaches.
I separated the eleven items into two main groups—issue attitudes and feeling
thermometers—with seven items in the issue attitudes group and four items in the feeling
thermometers groups. I expect issue attitudes to follow a basic pattern of stability with
any change tending to occur in a conservative direction. With regards to the feeling
thermometers, I expect the reverse to be true. I expect stability for these tolerance
attitudes, but any change will likely be in a more tolerant direction. The results for the
issue attitudes group are shown in Table 4, and the results of the feeling thermometers
group are shown in Table 5. I ran model fit analyses for each item. Initially, I constrained
the model to five latent classes for each item, and then I used the Vuong-Lo-MendellRubin Likelihood Ratio Test (VLMR-LRT) to decide if the model was a better fit than a
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model with one fewer class. If the model was a better fit than the K-1 model (p<.05), then
I selected that model. If the model was not a better fit, I then ran the K-1 model to see if
the four-class model fir better than a three-class model. I continued this process until I
found a model with a better fit than the model with one fewer class.
After each model is selected, it is possible to determine the proportion of the
sample that fit into each of the groups. For instance, in Table 4 the only item which fit
into a five-class model was the seven-point ideology scale. This model indicates 25
percent of the sample stayed conservative, 16 percent stayed liberal, 33 percent stayed
moderate, 21 percent changed in a conservative direction, and 4 percent moved in a
liberal direction. For six out of the seven issue attitudes, a general pattern of stability
holds; whereby a majority remains relatively stable over time while a minority changes
over time. Across all items, an average of 75 percent of participants remained relatively
stable over time, and 25 percent of participants were relatively labile over time. The only
item for which this pattern did not occur was a question about protecting the rights of the
accused. Over 60 percent of the sample displayed a change pattern, with most of those
people changing in a conservative direction.
These patterns suggest the predominant pattern over time is one of stability. Of
those who did change over time, there was a clear shift towards conservatism as 17
percent of the sample became more conservative across items and only 7 percent became
more liberal. Another way to look at this pattern is that, on average, 71 percent of people
who changed did so in a conservative direction while 29 percent moved in a more liberal
direction. The only items where this pattern did not hold were the issue of government
guaranteed jobs (22 percent moved liberal, none moved conservative) and the issue of
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women’s role in society (8 percent moved liberal, 6 percent moved conservative). There
is support for the main expectations, as the general pattern is one of stability. Of those
who did change, there was a higher likelihood of them changing in a conservative
direction for most issues. Yet, there were important deviations with women’s roles and
guaranteed jobs. People tending to become more liberal on the issue of women’s roles in
society fits with the hypothesis pertaining to tolerance. However, the deviation of
guaranteed jobs from this pattern is not predicted by any hypothesis.
Table 5 shows the means and slopes associated with each latent class identified in
the GMMs. Each latent class is defined by the pattern of change for a given item, and
there are five possible latent classes per item, as people could Stay Conservative, Stay
Liberal, Stay Moderate, Move Liberal, or Move Conservative on each item. The means
are the mean value at Time 1 of the latent class for a given variable. For instance, those in
the Stay Conservative latent class for ideological self-identification had a mean value of
5.05 on the seven-point ideology scale in 1973. The slopes represent the degree and
direction of change over time for the latent class. Positive slopes indicate change in a
conservative direction, and slopes with higher absolute values indicate steeper degrees of
change. Returning to the example of the Ideology Stay Conservative latent class, their
slope was .207 (p<.001). This modest, positive slope indicates that those in the Ideology
Stay Conservative latent class became slightly more conservative on average between
1973 and 19977.

7

Validation measures, specifically the classification probabilities for most likely latent class membership,
can be found in the appendix. Classification probabilities ranged from .520 to .996 with most being in the
.80-.90 range.
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Table 2.5: Issue Attitudes Latent Class Means and Slopes
Issue Attitude Mean (s.e.) at p-value of
Slope (s.e.)
p-value of
& Latent Class Time 1
Mean
Slope
Ideology SC
5.05 (.297)
<.001
.207 (.062)
<.001
Ideology SL
2.56 (.122)
<.001
-.023 (.048)
.63
Ideology SM
3.85 (.107)
<.001
.052 (.04)
.19
Ideology MC
3.42 (.215)
<.001
.789 (.105)
<.001
Ideology ML
4.90 (.242)
<.001
-.894 (.100)
<.001
PID SC
4.90 (.117)
<.001
.197 (.03)
<.001
PID SL
2.72 (.08)
<.001
-.138 (.017)
<.001
PID MC
1.96 (.18)
<.001
.984 (.052)
<.001
PID ML
6.13 (.339)
<.001
-.895 (.10)
<.001
Jobs SC
4.45 (.08)
<.001
.299 (.038)
<.001
Jobs ML
4.85 (.218)
<.001
-.592 (.083)
<.001
Marijuana SC 6.72 (.032)
<.001
-.529 (.042)
<.001
Marijuana SL 1.29 (.04)
<.001
.514 (.049)
<.001
Marijuana SM 3.90 (.052)
<.001
.270 (.046)
<.001
Marijuana MC 1.60 (.115)
<.001
1.537 (.102)
<.001
Minority Asst. 4.73 (.126)
<.001
.084 (.059)
<.001
SC
Minority Asst. 2.68 (.192)
<.001
.136 (.075)
.07
SL
Minority Asst. 3.00 (.20)
<.001
.967 (.111)
<.001
MC
Minority Asst. 5.34 (.344)
<.001
-1.079 (.272) <.001
ML
Accused
5.43 (.156)
<.001
.057 (.066)
.39
Rights SC
Accused
2.33 (.174)
<.001
-.020 (.08)
.80
Rights SL
Accused
3.11 (.226)
<.001
.677 (.105)
<.001
Rights MC
Accused
5.20 (.299)
<.001
-.921 (.191)
<.001
Rights ML
Women’s Role 2.06 (.076)
<.001
-.308 (.026)
<.001
SL
Women’s Role 3.66 (.162)
<.001
-.020 (.063)
.75
SM
Women’s Role 4.05 (.547)
<.001
.547 (.110)
<.001
MC
Women’s Role 5.14 (.211)
<.001
-1.43 (.095)
<.001
ML
Scales for all items range from 1-7. Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive slopes
indicate change in a conservative direction. Negative slopes indicate change in a liberal
direction.
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Most of the latent classes identified as stable (9/15 latent classes) display similar
patterns of change. When the slopes indicate significant change over time, the slopes tend
to be modest (between .200 and .300) and in the direction of the identified group which is
to say people who start off liberal and stay liberal tended to get a little more liberal and
people who start off conservative and stay conservative tended to get a little more
conservative. There are exceptions to this pattern, particularly in regards to the issue of
marijuana. People who started off conservative on the marijuana issue and stayed
conservative started off at a very high level of conservatism (M = 6.72, SE = .032) but
had a relatively high degree of change in a liberal direction over time (slope = -.529, SE =
.049, p < .001). Even though this group displayed a relatively high degree of change, their
high starting point led them to still be conservative on the issue in 1997. Similarly, people
who started off liberal on the marijuana issue started off extremely liberal (M = 1.29, SE
= .04) but became significantly more conservative on the issue (slope = .514, SE = .049,
p < .001). These results suggest a significant process of moderation on this issue.
The models in Table 6 are based off four feeling thermometers that were
presented to MSS participants in 1965, 1973, 1982, and 1997. These feeling
thermometers asked participants to mark their feelings toward the given target on a scale
ranging from 0-100 with 0 indicating the coldest possible feelings toward the target group
and 100 indicating the warmest possible feelings toward the target group. The first two
target groups are demographic groups, black people, and white people, and the last two
groups are economic groups, labor unions and big business. Here, as with issue attitudes,
people tended to remain relatively stable in their feelings towards these groups with 89
percent remaining stable on average. My expectation, however, was that people who did
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change overtime would tend to become more tolerant. Yet, of the remaining 11 percent
who were labile over time, the greatest tendency was a move towards intolerance. This
finding is driven by the fact that the white people feeling thermometer had the most
lability in an intolerant direction, as nearly 30 percent of respondents became more
intolerant of white people between 1965 and 1997. This number dwarfs the percentage of
people who became more intolerant of black people (.6 percent), labor unions (2 percent),
and big business (0 percent).
The stability of these feeling thermometers is quite remarkable. It appears
peoples’ attitudes towards groups are quite stable throughout time. I expected any change
to these attitudes would be in a more tolerant direction, but this expectation is only
supported in regards to black people. A little over 6 percent of respondents became more
tolerant towards black people. Although many did not become more tolerant, even fewer
became less tolerant, as only .006 percent became more intolerant. The only other group
which saw any appreciable change towards tolerance was white people (7 percent). There
was no meaningful change in a tolerant direction in regards to feelings towards labor
unions or big business. These findings run counter to my expectations in interesting
ways. A tendency toward increasing tolerance cannot be expected for all groups. As
black people are the only truly marginalized group of the four and the only group which
saw more change in a tolerant rather than intolerant direction, it is possible this tendency
toward increased tolerance applies only to groups marginalized by society. It is possible
business and labor union tolerance is perhaps best captured as a subset of left-right
politics in the United States, as those on the Right should favor big business and disfavor
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labor union and vice versa for those on the Left. Indeed, the findings pertaining to these
groups best fit the expectations I set for the left-right issue attitudes discussed earlier.
Table 7 presents the means and slopes for the latent classes associated with each
of the thermometers. Seven out of the ten latent classes identified showed moderate levels
of change. These results are similar in many respects to the levels of change found among
the stable latent classes associated with issue attitudes. Much like the change found
among the stable latent classes associated with issue attitudes, the levels of change are
such that people who were intolerant in 1973 were still intolerant in 1997 and people who
were tolerant in 1973 were still tolerant in 1997. Furthermore, people who started off
intolerant tended to become slightly more intolerant, and people who started off tolerant
tended to become slightly more tolerant. An important caveat to this generalization can
be found in regards to the black people feeling thermometer, as those who started off
intolerant became slightly more tolerant (slope = 9.61, SE = 1.19, p <.001).
Overall, more work needs to be done to disentangle the differences in how issue
attitudes and tolerance attitudes change throughout the lifespan. It is perhaps surprising
and even disheartening to see that tolerance attitudes saw far less change between 1965
and 1997 than was seen for issue attitudes. One might expect that the increase in civil
rights for black Americans during that timeframe would have warmed the hearts of more
white Americans. Yet, most during this time stayed relatively ambivalent toward black
Americans.
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Table 2.7: Feeling Thermometers Latent Class Means and Slopes
Feeling
Mean (s.e.) at p-value of
Slope (s.e.)
p-value of
Thermometer
Time 1
Mean
Slope
& Latent Class
African12.91 (7.62)
.09
9.61 (1.19)
<.001
Americans SI
African77.91 (1.89)
<.001
2.02 (.53)
<.001
Americans ST
African62.92 (.948)
<.001
-1.76 (.308)
<.001
Americans SA
African36.43 (6.73)
<.001
-7.48 (2.26)
<.001
Americans MI
African46.79 (4.44)
<.001
8.36 (1.37)
<.001
Americans MT
White88.61 (.778)
<.001
-.854 (.236)
<.001
Americans ST
White59.29 (1.27)
<.001
-.555 (.428)
.20
Americans SA
White88.54 (.929)
<.001
-8.32 (.305)
<.001
Americans MI
White58.61 (1.76)
<.001
6.63 (.836)
<.001
Americans MT
Labor SI
45.46 (4.12)
<.001
-4.78 (1.24)
<.001
Labor ST
64.10 (3.44)
<.001
4.54 (.808)
<.001
Labor SA
56.24 (1.27)
<.001
-.759 (.433)
.08
Labor MI
76.15 (9.56)
<.001
-16.05 (3.01) <.001
Business ST
59.38 (1.70)
<.001
.270 (.738)
.72
Business SA
53.07 (.957)
<.001
-3.31 (.392)
<.001
Scales for all items range from 0-100. Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive slopes
indicate change in a tolerant direction. Negative slopes indicate change in an intolerant
direction.

2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
These findings add to our understanding of American politics. There are
individual differences in how people change over time. The dominant pattern of change
among issue attitudes and feeling thermometers was a pattern of stability. In fact, of the
seven issue attitudes and four feeling thermometers, only one item—protecting the rights
of the accused—had most respondents in latent classes defined by lability. As I expected,
when people did change on issues they were most likely to do so in a conservative
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direction. However, this pattern did not hold across all issues and feeling thermometers.
Moreover, issues pertaining to tolerance of outgroups saw more people change in a
liberal or tolerant direction as opposed to a more conservative or intolerant direction.
The nature of attitudinal change through the lifespan is much more nuanced than
the conventional wisdom that people simply become more conservative as they grow
older. Treating attitudinal change over time as an individual difference makes it possible
to explore these nuances further. People, it seems, tend to stay the same politically.8
When a small portion of a cohort does change attitudinally over time, they tend to move
in a conservative direction. It is possible the 17 percent of people who became more
conservative over time, when compared with the 7 percent of people who became more
liberal, leads to the perception that most people become more conservative as they grow
older. However, when it comes to issues of tolerance, people became significantly more
liberal on the issues of women’s role in society and their feelings toward black people
when those attitudes did change.
The approach I took allows us to categorize people into groups pertaining to the
nature of their attitudinal change over time, and I can observe differing patterns of change
based on the type of attitude. Given the recent rise of nationalistic politics which seek to
vilify marginalized groups for political gain, it is important that we begin to disentangle
the reasons behind attitudinal change. The difference in patterns of change between issue
attitudes and tolerance attitudes is particularly striking. When people change in regards to
policy, they tend to do so in a conservative direction. When people change in regards to
their attitudes toward marginalized groups, they tend to change in a more tolerant

8

A lack of data between the ages of 18-26 for many of these issues prohibits me from speaking more broadly
about how these data fit into something like the impressionable years model.
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direction. However, the probability of change occurring is significantly lower for these
tolerance attitudes than it is for policy attitudes. Much ink has been spilt over the rapidly
increased tolerance towards the LGBT community in the United States over the past 1015 years, and this increased tolerance has generally led to more policies that support the
LGBT community. It appears attitudes toward black Americans did not improve enough
to lead to more policies to support black Americans. Future work should examine the
sources of changing attitudes. The ability to identify groups based on their propensity
change is much easier given the methods I employed with this chapter. It is possible that
these sources are part of the natural aging process. If so, it may be difficult to induce
attitudinal change. However, if the sources of change are due to environmental sources,
we might be able to push along the process of change.
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Chapter 3: Establishing and Examining the Heritability of
Attitudinal Stability
3.1 Introduction
Many studies have shown political traits such as ideology, partisan attachment,
and political participation are heritable traits (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Brandt
and Wetherell 2011; Deppe et al. 2013; Fowler and Dawes 2008; Fowler & Dawes 2013;
Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008; Friesen and Ksiakiewicz 2014; Funk et al. 2013;
Hatemi, Medland, and Eaves 2009; Hatemi et al. 2007; Hatemi et al. 2009; Hatemi et al.
2011; Hatemi et al. 2014; Klemmensen et al. 2012; Loewen and Dawes 2012; Settle,
Dawes, & Fowler, 2009; Settle et al., 2010; Settle et al., 2011; Smith et al. 2011a;
Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2011). The propensity to be liberal or conservative or a
strong or weak partisan is, in part, influenced by our genetics. The heritability of these
traits indicates they should be relatively stable traits. That is, people who are liberal have
a high likelihood of remaining liberal, and people who are conservative have a high
likelihood of remaining conservative. This general takeaway from these studies was
corroborated by my findings in the last chapter. For the most part, people in the Michigan
Socialization Study held stable political attitudes throughout their lifespan.
Although the modal pattern of attitudes over the lifespan is marked by stability, it
is clear from my last chapter and ample anecdotes that some people do change their
political attitudes throughout life. In the last chapter I demonstrated there is no one-sizefits-all model of attitudinal stability. This chapter and the next will focus on the question
of what predicts differing patterns of attitudinal stability. Broadly, I expect patterns of
attitudinal stability to be predicted by biological and psychological sources as well as
sociological sources. Here I will focus my attention on the biological and psychological
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sources of attitudinal stability and the direction of attitudinal change. Specifically, I will
test the degree to which attitudinal stability and the direction of attitudinal change over
time are heritable traits. Using a data set of Australian twins who were surveyed at two
time points 18-24 months apart, I will be able to determine how much those twins
changed attitudinally, the direction in which they changed, and the degree to which these
patterns are heritable.
Beyond assessing the heritability of attitudinal stability, utilizing a Classic Twin
Design (CTD) allows me to partition the variance associated with stability into three
categories—additive genetic effects, common environment effects, and unique
environmental effects. The results of the analyses will shed light on where to search for
the sources of attitudinal stability and the direction of attitudinal change. If an additive
genetic effect is found, then it would suggest the source of attitudinal stability and the
direction of attitudinal change might be rooted in some facet of personality. Shared
environmental effects might point to a role of familial socialization, and unique
environmental effects might point to a role of life events.

3.2 Theoretical Background
Following the last chapter, it can be argued attitudinal stability is a trait that varies
among people. The question here becomes: is this trait genetically heritable? As
mentioned previously, several political traits have been found to be either genetically
heritable, related to physiological processes, or both. Given the biological predispositions
underlying political behavior it is not far-fetched to imagine the stability of political
attitudes might not also be related to biological processes. If attitudinal stability does
have a heritable component, then other questions can be asked regarding whether the
heritability of attitudinal stability is shared with other traits such as personality.
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In the dozen years since Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) demonstrated the
heritability of ideological orientation many studies have examined the psychological and
biological foundations of numerous political traits. These studies have reached a number
of conclusions which have been replicated repeatedly. Chief among these findings is the
idea that liberals and conservatives differ in their physiological reactions to threatening or
novel stimuli. An overall negativity bias has been found to be the major difference
between liberals and conservatives, as conservatives tend to be more sensitive and
attuned to negative stimuli such as threatening sounds and disgusting images (Balzer and
Jacobs 2011; Dodd et al. 2012; Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014; Peterson, Smith, and
Hibbing 2016; Oxley et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2011b; Soroka and McAdams 2015).
This liberal-conservative difference in negativity bias has been found to be more
associated with social political attitudes such as abortion and gay marriage than it is with
economic issue attitudes such as feelings about small government and taxes (Adams,
Stewart, and Blanchar 2014; Brenner and Inbar 2015; Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014;
Smith et al. 2011b). The exact reason for these differences have not been fully fleshed out
and should be left for future work, but there is evidence that social issue attitudes are
genetically heritable while economic issue attitudes are less so (see Benjamin et al. 2012;
Brandt and Wetherell 2012; Friesen and Ksiakiewicz 2014). The biological
underpinnings of these social issue attitudes suggest, in part, that we are predisposed to
these attitudes from birth and that they may be difficult to change later in life. We know,
however, these attitudes do change for some people. It is possible all the change
associated with social issue attitudes comes from environmental sources, but there is also
a chance the source of change in these biologically rooted attitudes is itself biological.
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3.3 Hypotheses
I expect there will be a heritable component of attitudinal stability and for the
direction of any change. Following the findings regarding our understanding of the
biological foundations of political attitudes, I expect the heritability of attitudinal stability
will be higher for social issue attitudes than it is for economic issue attitudes.

3.4 Data
The data for this chapter are drawn from a sample of twins from Australia who
were surveyed at two separate time points as a part of a larger study on the genetic and
environmental underpinnings of social, economic, and political behaviors (Hatemi et al.
2015). The first wave of data was collected from July 2008 to December 2009, and the
researchers targeted twins between the ages of 19 and 30. The researchers who collected
the data were able to collect data from 250 complete twin pairs and 86 single twins
during this period of data collection. The second wave of data were collected 18-24
months (between July 2010 and November 2011) after the first wave of data collection.
During this time, the researchers were able to recontact 379 twins from the first wave of
data collection along with 157 new twins, 566 mothers of twins, 360 fathers of twins, and
120 non-twin siblings of twins. For the purposes of this study, I examined the data of all
twin pairs for whom there were political attitude data at both time points. After removing
single twins and twin pairs with missing attitudinal data at either time point, I was left
with 125 twin pairs. There were 53 monozygotic twin pairs and 72 dizygotic twin pairs.
The attitudinal data came from a version of the Wilson and Patterson (1968)
battery modified for use in Australian politics. The battery presented subjects with a list
of 30 political attitudes such as “Free Trade”, “Stricter Immigration”, or “War on Terror”,
and asked the subjects to select “Yes” if they agreed with the issue, “No” if they
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disagreed with the issue, and “Unsure” if they were unsure about the issue. This created a
three-point scale (1=Yes, 2=Unsure, 3=No) for each item. Items were recoded so that
higher values always indicated the most liberal response option. Data were collected for
each item during Wave I and Wave II. For each item, a change variable was created by
subtracting the value of the item in Wave II from the value of the item in Wave I and
taking the absolute value. A direction of change variable was taken by using the real
value of these differences. The resulting change variables have three potential values for
the absolute level of change (0=no change, 1=moderate change, 2=full change), and there
were five possible values for the real value of change (-2=full change to conservative, 1=moderate to conservative, 0=no change, 1=moderate change to liberal, 2=full change
to liberal). After creating change variables for each issue attitude on the Wilson-Patterson
inventory, I created six variables which represented change for a subset of attitudes. The
first two are Total Change variable which added the total change for all 23 WilsonPatterson items. I then created four more variables representing change on social issues
and economic issues. The items can be found in the endnotes.i

3.5 Methods
Using OpenMx v. 2.7.4 for R (Neale et al. 2016), I ran a series of univariate and
bivariate structural equation models to capture the variance associated with additive
genetic effects, common environmental effects, and unique environmental effects. These
models work under the assumptions laid out by the CTD. Namely, assumptions can be
made about the genetic and environmental relationships between sets of twins. There are
two different kinds of twin pairs—monozygotic and dizygotic. Monozygotic twins, often
referred to as identical twins, share 100 percent of their genes with each other. Dizygotic
twins, or fraternal twins, are like any other non-twin sibling pair in that they share 50
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percent of their genes on average. It is assumed that all twin pairs shared a common
environment growing up, as they grew up in the same household, attended the same
schools, had the same religious upbringing, etc.9 Given these two assumptions, it is
possible to partition the variance of a given trait into additive genetic, common
environmental, and unique environmental effects.
The univariate analyses will separate the three phenotypes of interest—Total
Wilson-Patterson Change, Social Issues Wilson-Patterson Change, and Economic Issues
Wilson-Patterson Change—into these three components. For each phenotype four models
were run. The first model—the full ACE model—includes all three potential sources of
variance. The second model—a reduced AE model—includes only additive genetic and
unique environmental sources of variation. The third model—the CE model—is a fully
environmental model as it only allows for common and unique environmental sources of
variation. The final model—the E model—only allows for the unique environmental
effect. As the AE, CE, and E models are nested within the full ACE model, it is possible
to use model fit statistics to choose the best fitting model. The best fitting model will be
the most parsimonious model that is not significantly different from the full model. If all
the submodels perform significantly worse than the full ACE model, then the full ACE
model will be treated as the best fitting model.

9

There is some debate over the degree to which we can assume monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs truly
have equal environments growing up. It is argued that dizygotic twins are more likely to be treated as
individuals, thus having less of a common environmental similarity, than monozygotic twins. Much ink has
been spilt over this issue of the Equal Environments Assumption, and good summaries of both sides of the
debate can be found here (Charney 2008) and here (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2008; Hannagan and Hatemi
2008). I do not wish to add to this debate further, but I find the arguments laid out by Alford, Funk, and
Hibbing (2008) and Hannagan and Hatemi (2008) to be the most convincing.
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3.6 Results
Table 3.1 displays the correlations broken down by twin pair type for the eight
phenotypes of interest for this chapter. The correlations were calculated by correlating the
value of a given phenotype for Twin 1 with the value of the same phenotype for Twin 2.
Traits with significant heritable effects will show higher correlations for MZ twins than
DZ twins. As such, it is likely that the total Wilson-Patterson change (𝑟𝑚𝑧 = .21 ; 𝑟𝑑𝑧 =
−.02) phenotype and the social Wilson-Patterson change (𝑟𝑚𝑧 = .33 ; 𝑟𝑑𝑧 = .04)
phenotype are somewhat heritable. Both variables display significantly higher
correlations between MZ twin pairs than they do for DZ twin pairs. Economic WilsonPatterson change (𝑟𝑚𝑧 = .02 ; 𝑟𝑑𝑧 = −.09) does not appear to be driven by heritability.
Of the directional variables, two of the three seem like they might have a heritable
component. Both the social (𝑟𝑚𝑧 = .20 ; 𝑟𝑑𝑧 = −.04) and economic (𝑟𝑚𝑧 = .21 ; 𝑟𝑑𝑧 =
.13) items have higher MZ correlations than DZ correlations. The total Wilson-Patterson
item (𝑟𝑚𝑧 = .10 ; 𝑟𝑑𝑧 = .17), however, seems as though it might have more influence
from the common environment given the larger DZ twin correlation relative to the MZ
twin correlation.
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Table 3.2 displays the results of the univariate ACE analyses for the three
ideological change variables. As described earlier, I ran four structural equation models
for each of the three ideological change variables. It is possible to then compare these
four models with each other to find the best fitting and most parsimonious (parsimony
defined as the fewest number of ACE components) model. Models with lower -2 loglikelihoods are better fitting than models with higher -2 log-likelihoods. The comparison
provides a p-value to ascertain whether the -2 log-likelihoods are significantly different
(lower p-values indicate significantly worse fit).
The analyses only find a role for heritability for social Wilson-Patterson change.
Change on all Wilson-Patterson items and change on economic Wilson-Patterson items
was entirely the product of unique environmental forces. For the total Wilson-Patterson,
the AE model was the same as the full ACE model, and is the best fitting model.
However, the A component, while showing an estimate of .14 (95% CI [0, .36]), was not
significantly different from zero. Given the overall small sample size, it is very likely this
estimate would be significantly greater than zero with the extra power. For economic
issue change, all models performed as well as the full ACE model, and the heritability
and common environmental estimates were 0 for all the models. It is possible that small
heritability (A² = 0, 95% CI [0, .21]) and common environmental (C² = 0, 95% CI [0,
.13]) effects, but these effects, even with a significantly larger sample, would likely be
small.
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As I expected, any heritability associated with attitudinal change was found with
social issues rather than economic issues. For social Wilson-Patterson change, the AE
was the best performing model, and there were significant effects for both the additive
genetic (A²=.27, 95% CI [.03-.48]) and unique environmental (E²=.73, 95% CI [.52-.97])
components. Therefore, within this population of twins, 27 percent of the variance
associated with change on social issue attitudes can be attributed to genetic effects. These
findings add more to the growing literature surrounding the biology of political attitudes,
as the attitudes most associated with biological traits tend to be social issues. I have
shown here that even the attitudinal stability surrounding these issues can be explained in
part by biological forces. Intriguingly, these are fairly conservative tests of attitudinal
stability as the stability was measured through two time points only 18 months apart.
Regardless of genetic effect, it is also clear that unique environmental influences play the
largest role in predisposing people towards attitudinal instability.
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For the next set of analyses, I examined the variation associated with the direction
of attitudinal change. Here, as with the last set of analyses, I expect social issue attitudes
to be most predicted by heritability. I ran univariate ACE analyses with the directional
change variables, just as I did for the last set of change variables. In Table 3.3 I present
the results of these analyses. For Total Wilson-Patterson change, the best fitting model
was the CE model. This is unsurprising given the larger correlation for this trait between
DZ twins rather than the expected MZ twins. In the CE model, we see common
environmental effects (C²=.13, 95% CI [.00-.30]) explaining at least some of the
variation, but unique environmental effects (E²=.87, 95% CI [.70-1]) comprising the bulk
of variation explained.
Moving on to social Wilson-Patterson change, the AE model is the best fitting
model with additive genetic factors explaining 10 percent (95% CI [0-.36]) of the
variation associated with the direction of change on social issue attitudes. Again, unique
environmental effects (E²=.90, 95% CI [.64-1]) explain the vast majority of variation
associated with this trait. Finally, the direction of economic issue attitude change was the
first trait predicted by additive genetic (A²=.16, 95% CI [0-.36]), common environmental
(C²=.07, 95% CI [0-.34]), and unique environmental (E²=.77, 95% CI [.56-.99]) effects.
The AE sub-model, although it performs worse than the full ACE model, suggests the A
estimate may be as high as .24 (95% CI [.01-.44]). Contrary to my expectations, the A
estimate for the direction of economic issue attitude change in both the ACE and AE
models is larger than the A estimate in the models predicting social issue attitude change.
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
It is very possible that the results of this chapter were hampered by a power issue
with the data. Regardless, there was meaningful support for the most important
expectations. There is a heritable component of attitudinal change and the direction of
attitudinal change, and that heritable component is most evident for change on social
issue attitudes. The results from this chapter are instructive in terms of where we should
look for the sources of attitudinal stability. Much of the variance surrounding attitudinal
stability is associated with unique environmental sources. This finding means we need to
examine life events and other external sources when looking for the sources of attitudinal
instability. In the next chapter I will focus more on uncovering these sources of lability. It
is clear more work needs to be done to uncover these environmental sources of attitudinal
stability, but there also should be a focus on gene-environment interactions. The power
issue with this sample greatly limited my ability to explore simple shared genetic
pathways between personality traits and attitudinal stability. Yet, it can also be the case
that certain traits influenced by genetics—personality or otherwise—may make some
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people more susceptible to change their prior beliefs as the result of particular
environmental stimuli.
Beyond the environmental sources of change, it is clear genetics does play a role,
however limited, in the stability of social issue attitudes. Given the relatively short period
of time between waves (~18-24 months), it is intriguing that any effect of heritability was
uncovered in the first place. Although I have not examined the direction of this instability
and thus cannot show these twins were moving in the same direction, it still shows the
heritability of political attitudes is more complex than initially imagined. The twin pairs
in this sample were fairly young at the time of both waves (19-30 years old). This portion
of lifespan development is associated with attitudinal instability (Jennings and Niemi
1981). This portion of lifespan development also happens to be the time when political
attitudes can begin to be explained by genetic heritability (Hatemi et al. 2009). With a
larger longitudinal twin design that has more variation associated with age it would be
possible to better understand how these patterns of heritability look like across the
lifespan. It is very possible that attitudinal change is more heritable early in life, but this
heritability may taper off later in life as environmental sources of instability become
more prominent.
Finding these sources of attitudinal stability is an important task to undertake.
Partisan polarization is arguably one of the most pressing issues facing American
democracy today. Certainly, we can, and should, always expect vigorous debate and
disagreement within a healthy democracy. Yet, the partisan rancor Americans face today
is at historic levels. Americans on both sides of the political aisle are beginning to see
those on the other side as enemies. Understanding the sources of attitudinal stability
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might help us to better grasp how to bring Americans back together to a place of
amicable—rather than vitriolic—disagreement. If the sources of attitudinal stability can
be traced to biology, as I have done in this chapter, and we can trace these biological
sources to easily observable traits, then it becomes possible to identify people who are
more likely to change their existing attitudes. Again, I must stress that heritability
accounts for a very small amount of variation in attitudinal stability, but the existence of
heritability effects does help me to further understand the roots of attitudinal stability.
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Chapter 4: Exploring the Psychological Correlates of
Attitudinal Instability
4.1 Introduction
As I established in the two prior chapters, attitudinal stability is a trait that differs
across people and can partly be explained by genetic heritability. In the last chapter, I
began the process of trying to examine where the sources of attitudinal instability may
lie. The main finding was that genetic heritability worked to influence the stability of
social issue attitudes. As I argued in the last chapter, a significant heritability effect
indicates there are likely underlying psychological dispositions driving the likelihood of
change. Yet, as the last chapter also demonstrated, unique environmental effects, not
genetics, comprised the largest portion of variance associated with attitudinal stability.
Therefore, it is likely some of the sources of attitudinal stability will be psychological,
but it will be more fruitful to examine the role of life events play in attitudinal instability.
To this point, much of the work examining why people change their political attitudes has
focused on these kinds of events (see Dinas 2013, Erikson and Stoker 2011, Healy and
Malhotra 2013, Sears 1981, Sears and Valentino 1997). Life events are idiosyncratic and
can affect people in different ways. The fact that life events are expected to be the main
predictor of attitudinal stability does not preclude biological influences beyond those
discussed previously. In fact, evidence has shown gene-environment interactions can
influence political attitudes (Hatemi 2013).
In this chapter and the next I will analyze the various sources of attitudinal
instability. Too often we see attitudinal instability treated as evidence for the lack of
meaningful attitudes (see Converse 1964). As such, there has not been much work
exploring the sources of attitudinal stability. The previous two chapters demonstrated
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attitudinal stability ought to be treated as an individual difference and not readily
dismissed as the result of non-attitudes. Although the predominant pattern of attitudes
over the lifespan appears to be a pattern of stability, there are a meaningful amount of
people who did display initial patterns of instability which remained persistent
throughout the lifespan. On top of that, these patterns of instability may be rooted partly
in biology, as the last chapter demonstrated. Therefore, it behooves us to further
understand what drives these moments of instability. The next two chapters will add to
the overall understanding of the role of attitudes.
The analytic strategy for the next two chapters will utilize the same datasets as the
previous two chapters. To explore the effects of life events and other forces of
socialization on attitudinal instability I will return to the Michigan Youth-Parent
Socialization Study (Jennings, Markus, Niemi, and Stoker 2005) in the next chapter. This
dataset which I will describe in fuller detail later includes data on many events
throughout the lives of its subjects. These data include items on parenthood, education,
military service, and changes in economic standing. I will utilize the group
categorizations which were derived from the analyses in Chapter 2 as dependent
variables. I expect there will be a good deal of variation in attitudinal stability explained
by these kinds of more sociological life events. Where the MSS provides bountiful data
regarding life events, it has a relative dearth of data pertaining to the psychological states
of its participants. As such, I focus my attention in the current chapter on how
psychological dispositions influence attitudinal stability.
For this chapter I will return to the dataset from where I took the Australian twin
data. The twin data utilized in the last chapter came from a much larger subset of
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longitudinal data collected in Australia (Hatemi et al. 2015). The larger subset of data
includes single twins, parents, and non-twin siblings. I will use this larger dataset to
examine the psychological correlates of attitudinal instability and the direction of attitude
change.

4.2 Theory
Psychological dispositions will very likely influence individual susceptibility to
attitudinal shifts. If, as I demonstrated in the last chapter, attitudinal stability is partly
heritable, the question becomes—why? It is very possible there are shared genetic
pathways between attitudinal stability and other heritable traits. One potential shared
genetic pathway is personality. Personality traits are deeply rooted in our biology (see
Plomin and Caspi 1990), and it makes a good deal of sense to think certain personality
traits could predispose people towards attitudinal lability. There are a number of
personality traits which have been linked with political attitudes and behavior. Traits such
as authoritarianism, social dominance, cognitive styles, self-esteem, and personal values
have all been linked to political traits (see Jost et al. 2003). The Big Five battery of
personality traits—openness to new experience, conscientiousness, extraversion,
agreeableness, and emotional stability—have long been used to predict political attitudes
and behaviors (see Mondak 2010). These traits may also be associated with attitudinal
stability.
Regarding openness to new experience, individuals who are open to new
experience tend to be people who seek out new art, cultures, and ideas (McCrae and
Costa 1987). Politically, people who are high on openness tend to be politically liberal
(Mondak 2010). Traits associated with openness are creativity, curiosity, intelligence, and
novelty seeking (McCrae and Costa 1987).). Those low in openness are seen as being
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close-minded (McCrae and Costa 1987).). As people who are more open are more likely
to seek out new ideas, it is likely that people who are high on this trait would be more
likely to come across new political ideas. In fact, Bakker, Hopmann, and Persson (2015)
show a weak effect of openness in predicting variability in German political party
affiliation. Although being more likely to come across new political ideas may lead
people to change their existing beliefs, openness may cause the reverse process.
The stratification of experience phenomenon suggests that as a person comes
across more new ideas in their lifetime, they become less likely they are to change
because of those new ideas (Mannheim 1952; Sears 1981). Mannheim (1952, p. 177)
discusses stratification of experience thusly:
“Early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the
world. All later experiences then tend to receive their meaning
from this original set, whether they appear as that set’s verification
and fulfillment or as its negation and antithesis. Experiences are
not accumulated in the course of a lifetime through a process of
summation or agglomerations, but are “dialectically” articulated in
the way described… This much, however, is certain, that even if
the rest of one’s life consisted in one long process of negation and
destruction of the natural worldview acquired in youth, the
determining influence of these early impressions would still be
predominant. For even in negation our orientation is fundamentally
centered upon that which is being negated, and we are thus still
unwittingly determined by it.”
As such, our prior attitudes—here I would argue the attitudes developed during the
impressionable period of young adulthood between the ages of 18-26—form our
worldview from which all new ideas and attitudes are assessed. So, perhaps unintuitively,
people become less likely to change their attitudes—and even become more hardened in
their existing beliefs—because of new information. If, as I imagine, people who are high
in openness are more likely to come across information, ideas, and attitudes, then it could
very conceivably follow that during the impressionable years of 18 and 26 these people
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are more recalcitrant in their attitudes, but after their worldview is constructed and
crystalized, they might actually become less likely to reorient their attitudes as the result
of all the information, ideas, and attitudes they come across.
On the opposite end of the political spectrum, people who are high in
conscientiousness tend to be politically conservative (Mondak 2010). Conscientiousness
is associated with people who are self-disciplined, organized, and hard-working. People
who display high levels of conscientiousness are bound to a sense of duty and have been
shown to have higher levels of traits such as conformity (DeYoung, Peterson, and
Higgins 2002). Given the conscientious person’s tendency towards discipline and
conformity it is possible these people are more rigid in their attitudes. As such, people
who are high in this trait may be less likely to change their political attitudes throughout
their lives. Since people who are more open tend to be more liberal and people who are
more conscientious tend to be more conservative, it is possible the asymmetry found in
Chapter 2—where people who started off liberal were more likely to become
conservative than the reverse for people who started off conservative—is the result of
personality influencing the likelihood of attitudinal stability. So, examining the
interaction of these personality variables and age will be important in uncovering whether
they lead to the asymmetric conservative shift.
Traits such as extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability are also linked
to political attitudes and behaviors. Unlike openness and conscientiousness, however,
these traits tend to have more context-based effects on political attitudes. Bakker (2016)
demonstrated a link between agreeableness and economically liberal attitudes. Individuallevel income levels mediated this linkage whereby those who were low in agreeableness
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were more likely to endorse conservative economic attitudes if they were poor and more
likely to endorse liberal economic attitudes if they were rich. However, the linkage
between these personality traits and attitudinal stability is a different matter. Extroverts
tend to be socially active people who know many other people. The increased social
networks of extroverted individuals may lead them to come across and adopt new ideas.
Agreeable people tend to be warm, empathetic, and seek out cooperation. These traits
may predispose a person towards adopting new beliefs to go along with the crowd.
Finally, emotional stability which is associated with people who are calm, cool, and
collected. People who are more emotional stable may also be more stable with their
attitudinal beliefs (Bakker, Hopmann, and Persson 2015).
Beyond the Big Five personality traits I will also examine the degree to which
social sensitivity and empathy influences attitudinal instability. Particularly, I will be
utilizing the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” task (RME) to measure levels of social
sensitivity, and the Empathy Quotient (EQ) battery to measures levels of empathy. The
RME presents a series of photographs to participants. Each picture displays a set of eyes
which each express a separate emotion. Participants are then asked to determine which
emotion the eyes are displaying. This measure has been inversely associated with autism
and provides a good test of the degree to which people are sensitive to the feelings of
others (see Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). Social sensitivity does not constitute the sum total
of empathy, but it is an important ability required for empathy. The EQ is a battery of
questions which work to measure the various affective and cognitive components
associated with empathy (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004). Items such as “I often
find it difficult to judge if something is rude or polite” and “I don’t tend to find social
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situations confusing” are used to measure EQ.
Together RME and EQ capture similar concepts, and both have been associated
with autism spectrum disorder and prosocial behaviors more broadly (Bailey, Henry, and
Von Hippel 2008). Prosociality, as defined as the action of engaging in behaviors for the
common good, has been associated with the tendency to form psychological attachments
to family and friends (Markiewicz, Doyle, and Brendgen 2001), organizations (O’Reilly
and Chatman 1986), and groups (Armenta et al. 2011). As attitudes are themselves
psychological attachments and can help one form group attachments to political party or
ideological labels, it follows that the tendency to be socially sensitive or empathetic may
be negatively associated with attitudinal instability. We know, for instance, that attitudes
such as party identification are driven by patterns of group attachments (Green,
Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). People who are more “groupish”—that is to say people
who are likely to have higher levels of prosociality—are more likely to identify as strong
partisans.
Prosociality should not be confused with any of the other personality traits
discussed above. Of the Big Five items, prosociality and the likelihood to form
attachments is most likely associated with agreeableness, but these traits are separate
from the traits covered in the Big Five. Furthermore, there may be some question as to
how the forming of social attachments might relate to openness. It is possible that
openness may cause people to create attachments with many different objects, but this
process in of itself would not lead to the negative relationship I predict between
prosociality and attitudinal instability. More important than the number of attachments
people form, prosociality should affect the strength of the attachments people form. It is
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possible, as an example, for a person who is high in openness and low on prosociality to
develop many weak attachments to objects, but the weakness of these attachments makes
them more prone to be thrown out capriciously. A person low in openness but high in
prosociality might develop fewer attachments, but these attachments should be strong and
relatively immutable.
Throughout my analyses, I examine the main effects of the Big Five personality
traits, social sensitivity as measured by the RME, and empathy as measured by the EQ as
they pertain to patterns of attitudinal stability for both total and social Wilson-Patterson
batteries I utilized in the previous chapter. I chose to focus on these two batteries and to
drop the economic battery because given the results of the previous chapter, these are the
two batteries I expect to be most explained by personality. I will also be examining how
personality variables interact with age. There are many things that could mediate the
relationships between these personality variables and attitudinal stability. For instance, I
could have chosen to interact these traits with sex, educational attainment, and a host of
other items. I chose to focus these interaction analyses on the mediating role of age
because the literature surrounding attitudinal stability suggests age is a major influence in
the likelihood of stability. Specifically, the period between the ages of 18 and 26 are
marked by relative instability compared to later years, and interacting personality with
age allows me to see how personality traits mediate this age-based expectation of
instability.

4.3 Hypotheses
Following the theoretical expectations discussed above, I assume personality,
including social sensitivity and empathy, will predict the likelihood of attitudinal
instability. I expect openness to be positively associated with attitudinal instability. The
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process of seeking out new ideas should make people high in this trait to be more likely
to be attitudinally labile. However, the expectations of stratification of experience suggest
openness may make people less likely to change as they grow older, as people are less
likely to change as the result of new information as they grow older. I expect
conscientiousness and emotional stability to be negatively associated with change. There
are no specific expectations for the roles of extraversion or agreeableness. Both social
sensitivity and empathy should be negatively associated with attitudinal instability.
The direction of attitudinal change will likely be associated with the traditionally
expected effects. Openness should be associated with change in a leftward direction, and
conscientiousness should be associated with change in a rightward direction. The other
three Big Five classifications likely will not have any significant effect on the direction of
attitudinal change. It is possible that some of these variables may be associated with
attitudinal change, but the literature surrounding the relationship between personality and
political attitudes does not provide many expectations for these variables, as their
importance regarding political attitudes seems to be rooted more in the interaction
between these variables and environmental context.
Although I would expect these variables to influence the direction of attitudinal
change given particular contexts, I will leave that question for future work, as it is beyond
the scope of this chapter. The social sensitivity and empathy variables should, however,
be associated with change in a leftward direction. Unlike the relationship between
personality and the likelihood of attitudinal change, I do not expect age to significantly
moderate the relationship between any of these personality variables and the direction of
change.
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4.4 Data
The data come from the same source described in the last chapter. The first wave
of data was collected in the latter half of 2008 to December 2009, and the second wave of
data were collected 18-24 months after the first wave was collected. The full data set
includes 1,844 people, but, excluding those who did not complete both waves of the
study, the total N was 370. Of those 370, 226 were female and 144 were male. As only
twins were surveyed in the first wave, all of the participants are individual twins who
ranged in age from 19-31 (M = 25.44, SD = 3.08). To eliminate the issue of nonindependence inherent to a dataset which included twin pairs, I randomly deleted one
twin from each pair included in the dataset. As a result, I was left with a final N of 245.
In addition to this larger dataset, I also return to the twin dataset utilized in the last
chapter to provide a preliminary look at how personality traits and attitudinal lability
might be related. Control variables for gender, income, education, and political leanings
will be included.
The attitudinal data are the same as four of the six variables utilized in the last
chapter. There are two variables representing the real and absolute values of total change
on the Wilson-Patterson scale and for social change on the Wilson-Patterson scale. The
Big Five personality data came from 44-item Big Five Inventory (John and Srivastava
1999). These data were gathered during Wave I.10 The Big Five Inventory (BFI) uses 44
items to capture five dimensions of personality—openness to experience,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability. People high in
openness to experience tend to be curious, imaginative, and artistic. Conscientious people

10

Big 5 personality data were collected during Wave II via the shorter Ten-Item Personality Inventory. As
the 44-item Big Five Inventory is a more robust measure of personality, I opted to use the Wave I data for
the purposes of analysis.
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tend to be organized, careful, and hardworking. Extraversion captures those who are
sociable, enthusiastic, and adventurous. Agreeable people are warm, compliant, and
modest. Emotionally stable people tend to be relaxed, content, and confident. Each of
these dimensions were measured with anywhere between 8-10 items in the BFI. Each
item consisted of a sentence that started with “I see myself as someone who…” and
ended with a statement pertaining to a personality trait such as “…likes to reflect and
play with ideas”. Participants were then asked to rate the degree to which the agreed with
the statement of themselves on a five-point scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to
“Strongly Agree”. The exact items used and the summary statistics for these variables can
be found in the endnotes.ii
To capture social sensitivity and empathy the researchers who collected the data
measured both RME and EQ. The RME task asked participants to select the emotion
displayed in seventeen separate pictures of emotionally expressive eyes. The eyes
conveyed both positive and negative emotions ranging from fear to lust. The RME score
added up the number of correct responses, and the values in the data range from a low of
4 correct responses to a perfect high of seventeen responses (M = 12.25, SD = 2.30). The
EQ was calculated from a battery of 18 items where participants were given a sentence,
and they were required to indicate the degree to which they agreed with the sentence
(exact item wording and summary statistics in endnotesiii).

4.5 Methods
I utilized OLS regression models to examine the relationships between personality
traits and attitudinal stability. For each personality trait, I ran eight separate models with
four models for both Wilson-Patterson batteries examined. For each battery, I ran two
main effects models—one predicting the stability of the attitude with a given personality
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trait and one predicting the direction of change for the attitude with the given personality
trait. I also ran two personality by age interaction models, again predicting stability and
the direction of change, for both attitudinal batteries. Following my analyses of individual
personality traits, I then ran four full models predicting the stability and direction of
change of both attitudinal batteries. These four models included all personality variables
as well as an age by openness interaction.

4.6 Results
The fuller Australian twins dataset which included 245 single twins to examine
the bivariate relationships between attitudinal change on the total Wilson-Patterson
battery, the social Wilson-Patterson battery, and personality. Table 4.1 displays the
bivariate correlations between change on all Wilson-Patterson items, the Big 5
personality traits, and the two measures, RME and EQ, associated with social sensitivity
and empathy. The bottom left corner of the correlation matrix represents the relationships
between the personality variables and the existence of change, and the upper right corner
of the matrix represents the relationships between personality and the direction of change.
The results of these analyses are interesting. There is strong support, as I expected, for the
idea that emotional stability (𝑟 = −.23, 𝑝 < .001), social sensitivity as measured by the
RME (𝑟 = −.25, 𝑝 < .001), and empathy (𝑟 = −.15, 𝑝 < .05) are negatively
associated with the likelihood of attitudinal change. Openness (𝑟 = −.08, 𝑝 = .21) and
conscientiousness (𝑟 = .17, 𝑝 < .01) did not behave as I expected. The signs on both
are reversed, as I expected openness to be positively associated with instability and
conscientiousness to be negatively associated with change.
The relationships between personality and the direction of attitudinal change are
all weaker than I expected, but many of them are in the direction I predicted. Openness
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(𝑟 = −.12, 𝑝 = .06), social sensitivity (𝑟 = −.12, 𝑝 < .05), and empathy (𝑟 = −.09,
𝑝 = .15) are all negatively associated with the direction of attitudinal change. Given the
coding of the directional variable where change in a conservative direction was coded
higher, these findings suggest that higher levels of openness, social sensitivity, and
empathy led people to change in a liberal direction. The other four personality
variables—conscientiousness (𝑟 = −.08, 𝑝 = .21), extraversion (𝑟 = −.04, 𝑝 = .47),
agreeableness (𝑟 = −.03, 𝑝 = .65), and emotional stability (𝑟 = .05, 𝑝 = .47)—were
not meaningfully related to the direction of attitudinal change. Of these non-relationships
only conscientiousness is truly surprising. I predicted conscientiousness would push
people to change in a conservative direction, but the sign for the relationship is negative
and the relationship is not significant.
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Much like the previous analyses, Table 4.2 presents the bivariate relationships
between the personality variables and attitudinal change, but for these analyses I
examined the relationship between personality and the subset of social issue attitudes. As
I demonstrated in the last chapter, change on these attitudes is most closely associated
with genetic heritability. Unlike the previously analyzed total battery, there are no
meaningful relationships between either openness (𝑟 = −.01, 𝑝 = .76) or
conscientiousness (𝑟 = .08, 𝑝 = .22) and change on social issue attitudes. There were
expected effects for emotional stability (𝑟 = −.13, 𝑝 < .05), social sensitivity (𝑟 =
−.28, 𝑝 < .001), and empathy (𝑟 = −.10, 𝑝 = .10). Therefore, whatever relationships
there are between openness, conscientiousness, and the total Wilson-Patterson battery are
likely due to change on some other sub-battery of Wilson-Patterson items.11
The direction of change on social issue attitudes was only related to extraversion
(𝑟 = −.13, 𝑝 < .05). These findings suggest that people higher in their overall levels of
extraversion were more likely to change in a liberal direction on these social issue
attitudes. Going against my expectations, openness (𝑟 = .02, 𝑝 = .77) and
conscientiousness (𝑟 = −.04, 𝑝 = .59) were not related to change on social issue
attitudes. Agreeableness (𝑟 = .06, 𝑝 = .33), emotional stability (𝑟 = −.00, 𝑝 = 1),
social sensitivity (𝑟 = −.06, 𝑝 = .30), and empathy (𝑟 = .06, 𝑝 = .39) were also all
unrelated to the direction of change on social issue attitudes. The direction of social issue
change could still be influenced by these personality variables, but any role they have is
very likely mediated by sociological forces.

People high in openness were less likely to change their attitudes regarding foreigners (𝑟 = −.6, 𝑝 <
.05), and people high in conscientiousness were more likely to change their attitudes regarding economic
(𝑟 = .17, 𝑝 < .01) and environmental issues (𝑟 = .24, 𝑝 < .001).
11
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After examining these bivariate relationships, I moved to multiple regression
models to examine how personality relates to attitudinal change when controlling for
factors such as sex, left-right political identification, income, and educational attainment.
For the e four dependent variables—change and direction on all Wilson-Patterson items
and change and direction on social Wilson-Patterson items—I ran two models for each of
the seven personality items. The first model for each is a main effects model which
examines the main effect of the given personality variable, and the second model includes
an interaction term to examine how age and personality interact to influence attitudinal
instability.
I present the models for openness in Table 4.3. In the main effects models,
openness works in the expected direction for the direction of total Wilson-Patterson
change (b = -.21, t(244) = -2.66, p <. 01). This finding demonstrates that when
controlling for demographic factors openness predisposes people to change in a liberal
direction. This finding was not replicated when I examined the relationship between
openness and the direction of social issue attitude change (b = -.00, t(244) = -0.08, p =
.935). So, whatever liberal change people high in openness exhibit, that change is coming
from issues other than social issues. The main effects models for the existence of total
and social issue change also do not support the expectations for the relationship between
openness and attitude change. Openness is negatively associated with the existence of
total change (b = -.10, t(244) = -1.96, p = .051), and it is not associated with the existence
of social issue change (b = -.03, t(244) = -0.76, p = .450). Just as was seen with the
bivariate relationships, openness seems to predispose people towards stable political
attitudes and not towards instability.

83

84
However, the interaction models tell a different story about the relationship
between openness and attitudinal instability. As I expected, there are significant
interactions between age and openness for both total Wilson-Patterson change (b = -.03,
t(244) = -1.93, p = .055) and social Wilson-Patterson change (b = -.02, t(244) = -2.02, p <
.05). These interactions work as I expected. Figure 4.1 displays a graph of the marginal
effect of openness on social Wilson-Patterson change (y-axis) as it relates to age (x-axis).
As I show in the figure, the relationship between openness and attitudinal instability
changes as people grow older. At the earliest point 18-year-olds who are high in openness
to experience are nearly more likely to be attitudinal labile (dy/dx = .16, t(244) = 1.63, p
= .105). This marginal effect decreases over time. By the time people who are high in
openness to experience turn 29 they are significantly less likely to be attitudinally labile
(dy/dx = .10, t(244) = -2.03, p < .05).
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Conscientiousness was expected to be negatively associated with attitudinal
change and positively associated with change in a conservative direction. In the bivariate
results, the relationship between conscientiousness and attitudinal change was not as
expected with conscientiousness being positively associated with total Wilson-Patterson
change, not associated with social Wilson-Patterson change, and not associated with the
direction of either total or social Wilson-Patterson change. Of the models presented in
Table 4.4, conscientiousness only shows a significant effect in the main effects model for
total Wilson-Patterson change (b = .19, t(244) = 3.20, p < .01). Again, as with the
bivariate model, conscientiousness is positively related to total change, meaning people
high in conscientiousness were more likely to change their attitudes. Furthermore,
conscientiousness was not associated with the direction of total change (b = -.08, t(244) =
0.94, p = .351), the existence of social change (b = .06, t(244) = 1.49, p = .137), nor the
direction of social change (b = -.02, t(244) = -0.34, p = .737).
Unlike openness, the effects of conscientiousness on the dependent variables were
not mediated by age. In the total change (b = .01, t(244) = 0.41, p = .681), direction of
total change (b = -.01, t(244) = -0.24, p = .812), social change (b = .00, t(244) = 0.29, p =
.770), and direction of social change (b = -.02, t(244) = -1.40, p = .163) models there
were no significant effects for the interaction of age and conscientiousness. So, when
conscientiousness affects attitudinal instability, it does not affect social issue attitudes,
and its effects do not change as people grow older. As explained in a previous footnote,
the effect of conscientiousness on total Wilson-Patterson change work through change on
economic issue attitudes and environmental issue attitudes. Future work should further
disentangle these effects.
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For the next two factors of the Big Five—extraversion and agreeableness—I did
not have many set expectations for how they would influence change and the direction of
attitudinal change, and neither displayed any significant bivariate relationships with the
four dependent variables. For the sake of due diligence, I ran the models for both
extraversion and agreeableness, and the results for these models can be found in Table
4.5 and Table 4.6. As expected, mostly null results are presented in these tables.
However, there are some marginal effects for both extraversion and agreeableness. In
terms of extraversion, it is not related to total change (b = .05, t(244) = 0.93, p = .351) or
direction (b = -.03, t(244) = -0.40, p = .692) nor is it related to social change (b = .03,
t(244) = 0.82, p = .411). It does, however, have a marginal effect on the direction of
social change (b = -.07, t(244) = -1.74, p = .084) indicating extroverted people may be
more likely to change in a liberal direction on social issues. None of the interaction
models found significant effects for extraversion.
In seven of the eight models for agreeableness presented in Table 4.6, there is no
significant effect for agreeableness. Agreeableness does have a marginal relationship
with the direction of social change when it interacts with age, as there is a marginally
significant interaction between the two (b = -.03, t(244) = -1.85, p = .066). The
visualization of this interaction can be found in Figure 4.2. This relationship shows that
between the ages of 18 (dy/dx = .29, t(244) = 2.04, p < .05) and 24 (dy/dx = .10, t(244) =
1.70, p = .090) the marginal effects of agreeableness make agreeable people more likely
to change in a conservative direction on social issue attitudes. From the age of 25 (dy/dx
= .07, t(244) = 1.32, p = .187) on, however, this relationship disappears, and agreeable
people become no more or less likely to move in either direction.
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Extraversion and agreeableness do not seem to have very strong relationships
with attitudinal strength. What small relationships that do exist are products of the
relationships between these two personality factors and the direction of social attitudinal
change. It is very possible these two factors are more associated with change on other
kinds of issue attitudes. In fact, bivariate relationships show a marginal effect between
agreeableness and the direction of environmental issue attitude change (𝑟 = −.12, 𝑝 =
.059). Bivariate analyses also showed a marginal effect between extraversion and the
direction of economic change (𝑟 = −.11, 𝑝 = .08) and a significant relationship
between extraversion and the direction of change for attitudes about foreigners (𝑟 = .13,
𝑝 < .05). In all, these two factors should be explored further when examining the
direction of attitudinal change.
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For emotional stability, I expected emotionally stable people to also be more
stable in their attitudes. Earlier I did show significant negative bivariate relationships
between emotional stability and the likelihood of total and social Wilson-Patterson
change. These relationships were in the expected direction. Moving to the multiple
regression models, the results for emotional stability are presented in Table 4.7. As
expected, there was a negative relationship between total change and emotional stability
(b = -.13, t(244) = -2.67, p < .01), but this relationship disappeared when examining the
relationship with social issue change (b = -.04, t(244) = -1.24, p = .215). These results
show that emotional stability does lead people to be more stable with their political
attitudes, but this relationship does not extend to social issue attitudes. Given the
significant bivariate relationship between emotional stability and social issue change, it
appears the control variables erased any effect.
Emotional stability also did not predict the direction of social change (b = .02,
t(244) = 0.48, p = .617), but it did predict the direction of total Wilson-Patterson change
(b = .16, t(244) = 1.99, p < .05). There were no specific relationships expected here, and
there were no significant bivariate relationships between emotional stability and the
direction of attitudinal change. Regardless, the results do show that people higher in
emotional stability were more likely to move in a conservative direction when controlling
for sex and other demographic characteristics. It is very possible the inclusion of sex in
the model led to the significant effect for emotional stability. The sudden significance of
emotional stability in this model suggests there could be an interaction between sex and
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emotional stability.12 This potential relationship is intriguing and would add to our
understanding of attitudinal change, but I will leave those analyses to future work.

12

Spoiler alert: There was a marginally significant interaction between emotional stability and sex (b = -.28,
t(244) = 1.69, p = .09). An examination of the marginal effects showed emotionally stable men were more
likely to move in a conservative direction (dy/dx = .27, t(244) = 2.62, p < .01) while emotionally stable
women were not prone to shift in any particular direction (dy/dx = -.01, t(244) = -0.10, p =.923).
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Social sensitivity as measured by the RME task and empathy as measured by the
EQ battery were the final two items I examined. Both items capture traits which are
regularly associated with prosocial behaviors. I argued prosociality leads to psychological
attachment which, in turn, should lead to more stable political attitudes. The bivariate
relationships between these items and total and social attitudinal change provided strong
support for these expectations. I also expected these items to be associated with change in
a liberal direction, but I only found support for this proposition when examining the
relationship between the RME and the direction of social issue attitude change. The
models for these two items are presented in Table 4.8 (RME) and Table 4.9 (EQ).
Of the two items, RME was most clearly associated with both the existence and
direction of attitudinal change. In the main effects models for the existence of change,
RME was associated with both total (b = -.41, t(244) = -3.97, p < .001) and social (b = .29, t(244) = -4.38, p < .001) change. There were interactions between RME and age in
either model examining the existence of change. So, there is again strong evidence for the
idea that social sensitivity predisposes people towards stable political attitudes, and this
relationship does not change as people grow older. Controlling for demographic factors
EQ no longer plays the same strong role in predicting attitudinal instability as it did in the
bivariate models. EQ does not predict social issue change (b = -.03, t(244) = -1.29, p =
.199), and it is marginally associated with total issue change (b = -.06, t(244) = -1.79, p =
.075). EQ does interact with age to predict the direction of social issue change (b = -.01,
t(244) = -1.83, p = .069). This interaction is plotted in Figure 4.3. It works so that
between the ages of 18 (dy/dx = .14, t(244) = 2.20, p < .05) and 25 (dy/dx = .05, t(244) =
2.12, p = .067) people high in empathy are more likely to move in a conservative
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direction on social issue attitudes, but from the ages of 26 (dy/dx = -.31, t(244) = -1.95, p
= .053) to 31 (dy/dx = -.31, t(244) = -1.95, p = .053) people high in EQ are not likely to
move in any specific direction. This finding is unexpected, as EQ was expected to predict
change in a leftward direction regardless of age.

Social sensitivity seems like a much stronger predictor of attitude change than
empathy writ large. Returning to RME, there is also some evidence to suggest it works to
influence the direction of attitudinal change. Specifically, there was a marginal
relationship in the main effects model between RME and the direction of total WilsonPatterson change (b = -.29, t(244) = -4.38, p < .001). This relationship is mediated by age
as there is also a marginal interaction between RME and age when predicting the
direction of total Wilson-Patterson change (b = -.11, t(244) = -1.93, p = .055). RME was
not associated with the direction of social issue attitude in the main effects model (b = -
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.08, t(244) = -1.05, p = 2.93) and does not interact with age to predict social issue attitude
change direction (b = -.03, t(244) = -0.99, p = .321). The interaction between RME and
age for the prediction of the direction of total attitude change can be found in Figure 4.4.
Here we see that between the ages of 18 (dy/dx = .54, t(244) = 1.17, p = .249) and 25
(dy/dx = -.21, t(244) = -1.23, p = .221) RME is not associated with change in a leftward
direction, but from 26 (dy/dx = -.31, t(244) = -1.95, p = .053) to 31 (dy/dx = -.85, t(244)
= -2.61, p < .01), RME is associated with leftward change.
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Finally, I ran four models which included all the variables I have examined up to
this point. These models all include an interaction effect for openness to new experience
and age. I display the results of the full models for total Wilson-Patterson change and the
direction of Wilson-Patterson change in Table 4.10 (total change) and Table 4.11 (social
change). In terms of main effects for predicting total change, conscientiousness (b = .17,
t(244) = 2.75, p < .01), emotional stability (b = -.14, t(244) = -2.66, p < .01), and RME (b
= -.38, t(244) = -3.83, p < .001) all remain significant predictors of attitudinal stability
when controlling for each other and demographics. Extraversion (b = .05, t(244) = 0.81, p
= .421), agreeableness (b = -.03, t(244) = -0.36, p = .721), and EQ (b = -.05, t(244) =
-1.42, p < .001) do not have significant effects. The interaction between openness and age
remains significant (b = -.04, t(244) = -2.39, p < .05). These relationships are in the same
direction as they were in the reduced models.
These findings are mostly all in line with my expectations. Earlier I had
speculated the ideological asymmetry between conscientiousness and openness, where
political liberals are more likely to be open and political conservatives are more likely to
be conscientious, could be behind the slight tendency of people to move in a conservative
direction as they grow older. I speculated openness could make people more likely to
change and conscientiousness could make people less likely to change thus leading to
that pattern. However, this pattern does not seem to be true. Conscientiousness does lead
to attitudinal stability, but openness causes people to be labile early in adulthood only to
make them more stable as they grow older.
Moreover, based on the results of the directional model I can show that openness
does not predict increased conservatism. So, whatever causes the slight conservative shift
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throughout the lifespan is not people higher in openness adopting more conservative
political beliefs. In fact, we should expect people higher in openness to become even
more firmly to the left as they grow older. In earlier figures, I graphed the marginal
effects of openness and other variables based on age. In Figure 4.5 plots the linear
prediction of total Wilson-Patterson change by age. Here the effect of openness is charted
at its mean level as well as at two standard deviations above and below the mean. Again,
the figure shows how people high in openness become less susceptible to change as they
grow older while people low in openness grow more susceptible to change.
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The direction of total Wilson-Patterson change did not have as many significant
predictors. Only emotional stability (b = .15, t(244) = 1.82, p = .071) and RME (b = -.34,
t(244) = -2.09, p < .05) worked to predict the direction of change. In all, the results of
these two models present compelling evidence to suggest personality traits predispose
people towards differing patterns of attitudinal stability. The evidence for this finding is
most convincing when examining the existence of attitudinal change, but there is also
some evidence to propose a link between personality traits and the direction of attitudinal
change. I only examined how personality interacts with age in these analyses, but it
would not be surprising to see personality to interact with other factors as it works to
influence both the existence and direction of attitudinal change.
Moving to a more contextualized example of how personality influence attitudinal
change, Table 4.11 presents evidence that the influence of personality on attitudinal
change can be domain specific. When examining the effect of personality on the
existence of social issue change, the effects for conscientiousness (b = .05, t(244) = 1.14,
p = .256) and emotional stability (b = -.05, t(244) = -1.35, p = .180) which were seen in
the total change models disappear. When compared with the total change models, these
findings point to the fact that any influence conscientiousness and emotional stability had
on attitudinal stability was due to their influence on other kinds of issue attitudes. RME
(b = -.14, t(244) = -2.66, p < .01) and the interaction between openness and age (b = -.14,
t(244) = -2.66, p < .01) remained significant predictors of attitudinal stability. Their
effects remain the same; so that, people with higher levels of social sensitivity are less
likely to change, and the effect of openness leads people high in this trait to become more
attitudinally stable as they grow older.
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Like the model for the direction of total Wilson-Patterson change, the model for
social Wilson-Patterson change does not have many significant predictors. Both
extraversion (b = -.10, t(244) = -2.112, p < .05) and EQ (b = .05, t(244) = 1.69, p = .092)
demonstrate effects on the direction of social issue attitude change. Again, the positive
effect for EQ, indicating change in a conservative direction, is unexpected, but as I
showed earlier EQ interacts with age so that people who are higher in EQ and between
the ages 18-25 were prone to shift in a conservative direction, but from 26 on the
marginal effect continued to decrease and EQ was no longer a significant predictor of the
direction of social issue change. Given a sample with participants older than 3, it is quite
possible I would find people high in EQ may be more likely to move in a liberal direction
as they grow older. A similar relationship was found earlier when examining the
interaction between RME and age as they predicted the direction of total issue change.
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4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Through multiple analyses I have demonstrated that personality works to shape
our likelihood to change our attitudes. Other than some previous work on the stability
German political party identification, this chapter is one of the first works to establish a
link between personality and attitudinal stability. I had already demonstrated attitudinal
stability can be partially explained by genetic heritability. I then showed that personality
factors, such as the Big Five inventory, performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
task, and Empathy Quotient scores, can also be partially explained by genetic heritability.
With a larger longitudinal twin dataset, it would be possible to test whether the genetic
pathways leading to attitudinal stability are the same pathways that lead to these
individual personality traits.
Of all the traits examined in this chapter, the RME had the strongest effect in
predicting the existence of attitudinal change across both measures. Empathy, as
measured by the EQ, showed a strong bivariate relationship with these variables, but its
effects were easily wiped out by including RME in the model. Social sensitivity seems to
be the important cognitive and affective component of empathy if we want to predict
attitudinal stability. I would argue the reason social sensitivity leads people to stand pat in
their beliefs is because of its association with prosocial behaviors more broadly. This
finding suggests our attitudes are partly rooted in our social lives and help to provide a
sense of group attachment and identity.
Regardless of which personality factors are better than others at predicting
attitudinal stability, it is clear personality also interacts with forces such as age to lead to
different effects throughout the lifespan. Future work will probably also show that
personality interacts with more than just age. Personality likely interacts with gender,
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education, income, and changes in the environment to lead people to differing likelihoods
of attitudinal instability. For instance, do agreeable people become more conservative if
they move from a liberal area to a conservative one or vice versa? To test these kinds of
important and intriguing questions a new largescale endeavor must be undertaken.
Longitudinal data should be collected starting in early adolescence and moving through
adulthood. These data should account for psychological and sociological factors so that
we may begin to more fully understand how these two forces work to shape the
development of attitudes throughout the lifespan.
Returning to the interaction between age and personality, I have shown how
processes previously discussed in the literature, such as the impressionable years model,
are influenced by individual-level differences in personality. The data did not allow me to
see how personality works with age beyond the age of 31, but it seems clear from the
analyses that there are likely personality types which predispose people towards
instability much later than the prevailing literature would suggest. Furthermore, as people
who are high in openness to experience start off more likely to change their attitudes
between the ages of 18-26 but less likely to change their attitudes afterwards, I have also
shown how the impressionable years model seems to provide more explanation for the
behaviors of people high in openness to experience than it does for others.
There is also the question of what it means for personality to predict one’s
tendency towards attitudinal stability. The potential linkage between prosociality and
attitudinal stability is profound. If attitudes are an integral role to our overall social
cohesion, then we have yet another reason for why attitudes are persistent and unlikely to
change en masse. However, scholars of persuasion might be able to devise ways in which
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prosociality can be used for the purposes of changing people’s attitudes. One mechanism
we have seen in recent months, perhaps, is the elite-level cue of Donald Trump. In the
past year, we have seen Republican attitudes shift on issues as varied as North American
Free Trade Agreement and United States foreign relations with Russia. As the attitudes
required for group membership have changed, we have seen those group members
change rather than to leave their group.
Throughout the models there was a strong and reliable effect for gender. Men
were more likely than women to change, and men were also more likely to change in a
conservative direction. I did spend much time focusing on this particular set of results,
but the strength of these findings is suggestive of gender-based differences in patterns of
attitudinal stability. These findings were replicated in the sets of analyses I present in the
next chapter. My primary focus for this dissertation is on how factors such as personality
and life events affect the likelihood of attitudinal stability. However, it is clear from these
results more work needs to be done in regards to this question of gender. Men appear to
adhere more to the folk wisdom than women, as they are more likely to become more
conservative as they grow older. There is an important set of questions here. Are these
gender differences rooted more in biological development across the lifespan, or are these
differences rooted more in sociological development based on existing gender role
expectations? There are known age-related sex differences in brain development which
could explain these findings given the right data (DeBellis et al. 2001), but traditional
family roles could also be an explanation, as many men are expected to the head of the
household.
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For the sake of brevity and due to having more theoretical expectations associated
with social issue attitude change, I did not spend any time in this chapter focusing on
economic issue attitude change. Preliminary analyses showed there were no real
significant differences when examining economic issue attitude change. There did not
seem to be a significant effect for openness, but emotional stability, RME, and EQ were
negatively associated with change while conscientiousness was positively associated with
change. No personality items were related to the direction of economic issue attitude
change. The lack of relationships with the direction of economic issue attitude change is
somewhat surprising, as conscientiousness should be expected to display change in a
conservative direction. Regardless, it is clear that the predictors of attitudinal stability
change across issue domain. This finding adds another wrinkle to our understanding of
attitudinal stability, as patterns of stability are not equal across policy type. Future work
should further examine the mechanisms underlying these domain-based differences.
To return to the major refrain of this dissertation so far, it is becoming
increasingly clear that we will do a disservice to the discipline if we do not begin to treat
attitudinal stability as an individual difference which some people will be more prone to
than others. The lack of attitudinal stability from one moment to the next is not
necessarily evidence for the existence of non-attitudes or the lack of ideological
sophistication in the public. We also need to take attitudinal domain into account when
we are examining attitudinal change, as there are separate sets of predictors for separate
issue factors. In the next chapter I will examine the sociological roots of attitudinal
instability to show that major life events also cause people to reconsider and update their
preexisting beliefs.
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Chapter 5: Exploring the Sociological Correlates of Attitudinal
Instability
5.1 Introduction
Forces of socialization cannot be ignored when trying to understand why attitudes
change over the lifespan. As I showed in Chapter 3, unique environmental effects were
more important to understanding variation in attitudinal stability than all combined additive
genetic and common environmental effects combined. In the last chapter I argued
personality influences our predispositions towards attitudinal stability. However, I took
special care to note how personality likely influences the degree to which life events and
other forces of socialization work in tandem to shape our political attitudes. In this chapter
I will examine how unique environmental effects influence attitudinal stability.
Here I will return to the Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Study (Jennings,
Markus, Niemi, and Stoker 2005) employed for the analyses in Chapter 2. In an ideal world,
this rich set of data would include personality as well as life events variables. There are a
handful of variables that approximate some aspects of personality such as self-confidence,
personal trust, and opinion strength, but most of the psychologically pertinent variables
included in the study are psychological variables that directly pertain to politics like
political efficacy, political trust, and political interest. The MSS more than makes up for
its paucity of psychologically relevant variables with a wealth of data covering a variety of
life events. Facets of life-stage development like role acquisition, status mobility, and
changing peer influences are all covered in great detail. As for dependent variables, I will
use the latent classes I calculated in Chapter 2. I will examine the latent class membership
associated with four of the eleven variables I explored in that earlier chapter—party
identification, ideology, minority assistance, and women’s role in society.
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In that second chapter I uncovered a pattern that held true for most of the political
attitudes I analyzed. The central pattern was one in which attitudes tended to remain stable
throughout the lifespan, but when attitudes did change, attitudes tended to change in a
markedly conservative direction. As folk wisdom suggests people become more
conservative as they age, this finding both buttressed and modified this prevailing wisdom.
Although there was a conservative tendency of those who changed, there was also a small
but significant group of people who moved in a liberal direction throughout their lives.
There are important questions to be answered as to why some people stand pat in their
beliefs, why some people move in a conservative direction, and why others move in a
liberal direction.
Uncovering the correlates driving stability and lability in conservative or liberal
directions will help to further the overall understanding of attitudinal change as it pertains
to the aging process. From here I will go through the literature surrounding how forces of
socialization have been found to affect attitudinal stability. A good portion of this literature
has to this point been solely interested in understanding how socialization influences the
existence of attitudinal stability but not the direction of attitudinal change. Following the
results of Chapter 2, I will be able to demonstrate how socializing forces influence both the
likelihood of attitudinal instability. So, after discussing the literature surrounding the
existence of attitudinal stability, I will work through the literature surrounding the direction
of attitudinal change to uncover what expectations there will be regarding how forces of
socialization influence the direction of attitudinal change. The literature to this point has
focused on cross-sectional data or has examined panel data in ways that overlook the
possibility that these kinds of latent classes exist. Unlike previous studies, this chapter
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includes the first analysis of attitudinal change and the direction of attitudinal change that
uses discrete groups defined by patterns of change as the primary unit of analysis. As I
have shown in the previous chapters, this approach is the ideal way to examine the nature
of attitudinal stability.

5.2 Theory
In terms of forces of socialization, Dinas (2013) identified six potential sources of
political attitude change—role acquisition, status mobility, changing peer influences,
stratification of experience, inertia, and identity diffusion. This list is an accurate and
useful representation of where scholars have looked for the causes of attitudinal stability.
Given the results of the last chapter, I would add psychological dispositions a seventh
potential source of attitudinal stability, but I will not be focusing on this source in this
chapter as it was covered in detail in the last chapter. Below I will explore the literatures
associated with these seven sources of attitudinal stability. The exact causes of attitudinal
instability are likely complex and interacting effects stemming from the sources below. In
terms of exploring the specific causes of attitudinal instability throughout the lifespan, I
will put less focus on the roles of inertia, stratification of experience, and identity
diffusion. Although the importance of these influences cannot be overstated, they do not
do much in the way of providing theoretically plausible and specific instances where
attitudes can be expected to change.
Role Acquisition
Throughout life people take on new roles. They become wives and husbands;
mothers and fathers. People move on from their roles as high school and college students,
and they become employees and bosses. Some join the military while others become
street protestors. Societal roles are in constant flux and have been shown to influence
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how people think politically. Brothers who have sisters have been shown to hold more
socially conservative attitudes in regards to gender roles (Healy and Malhotra 2013).
Older people must deal with many role changes, as people around them pass away, they
retire, and deal with illness. These role changes lead individuals to think about their
attitudes more than may have been needed in the past. This process of thinking, in turn,
leads people to change their attitudes (Sears 1981). The findings of Hatemi et al. (2009)
also follow the results reported by Sears (1981). They find the additive genetic effect for
political attitudes only begins to appear at around the age of 21, but by the time people
pass the age of 75 the genetic effect begins to disappear.
Status Mobility
In many ways status mobility is related to the previously discussed force of role
acquisition. Unlike role acquisition status mobility is more concerned with the effect of
economic resources and the acquisition of new social classes. This argument has a good
deal of support in conventional wisdom. It is often said the reason people become more
conservative as they grow older is because they begin to earn more money and
subsequently have more money taken in the form of taxes. The literature surrounding
how status mobility shapes political attitudes has been mixed up to this point (Turner
1992). There are debates within this literature surrounding the mechanisms by which
social mobility causes attitudes to change. We do know, however, that life altering events
can cause people to reevaluate things in their lives such as their political attitudes
(Hatemi 2013). Moving up the socioeconomic ladder may not necessarily cause people to
change their attitudes, as increasing affluence may be part of the life’s natural trajectory.
On the flipside, losing one’s socioeconomic standing is a more traumatic and unexpected
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event. The process of moving down the socioeconomic may be the kind of shock that
causes people to reconsider previously held political beliefs.
Changing Peer Influences
Outside of the strong forces of familial socialization, the friends we make shape
our political outlook (Langton 1967; Settle et al. 2010). Over time we lose old friends,
and we gain new friends. New friends expose us to new ideas, and these ideas may cause
us to shift our political beliefs. The acquisition of new peers oftentimes stems from
moving away from childhood homes. Going away to college or joining the military are
seen as two instances where people undergo drastic changes in their peer influences. The
conservative media and others are wont to portray college campuses as incubators of
liberal ideology. Whether colleges do make people more liberal remains to be seen, but
the likely driver of liberalization on college campuses is not college professors but the
new groups people are introduced to on campus. Military experience also introduces
people to new people and environments. Unlike the experience of going to college,
military experience likely promotes shifts in a conservative direction. Alternatively, the
competing goals of military service versus college education could also lead to these
differences. College education asks students to think critically about their assumptions
while military service asks new recruits to adhere to a strict hierarchy. These competing
goals could lead to a liberalizing effect of college and a conservatizing effect of military
service.
Inertia, Stratification of Experience, and Identity Diffusion
Inertia is a fairly straightforward source of attitudinal stability. The power of
inertia was displayed in the second chapter of this dissertation. People are remarkably
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stable in regards to the attitudes they hold throughout life. Attitudinal path dependency is
a powerful predictor of attitudes one day to the next and one year to the next. As attitudes
develop over time they become more likely to crystallize in the minds of those who hold
attitudes. Literatures focused on both the socializing (see Jennings and Niemi 1981) and
genetic (see Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014) factors of attitudinal development both
maintain inertia as the predominant predictor attitudes over time.
Stratification of experience is a psychological phenomenon that can lead to the
previously discussed force of inertia. The running tally model of political learning leans
on stratification of experience heavily as a means of explaining attitude change
throughout the lifespan (Achen 1992; Fiorina 1981). This psychological force makes it so
that the more political stimuli people encounter over their lives, the less likely they are to
change their attitudes as a result of new stimuli (see Mannheim 1952). Impressionable
years models also factor in stratification of experience as a force driving attitudinal
instability during young adulthood. Another force that works to explain the
impressionable years model is identity diffusion. Identity diffusion pertains to the process
of “finding one’s self” during young adulthood. During this period of time people are
seeking out their social and political identities. As people become older, their identities
become more entrenched and they are more likely to hew closer to homogenous
communities of likeminded individuals (Sears 1981). The phenomenon is evidenced by
the much-cited creation of “echo chambers” on social media and elsewhere. Through this
process people are less likely to come across new information challenging their political
beliefs. As a result, people become more entrenched in their political beliefs.
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These forces do not provide explanations for the exact reasons why people
change. They are predictors of attitudinal stability rather than attitudinal lability. The
theoretical expectations gleaned from the hypotheses tell us more about when attitudes
will change than they tell us why attitudes will change and in what direction. Certainly,
some of these theories can be pushed further to help us understand how particular stimuli
may drive attitudinal instability. For instance, work on “affective tipping points” has
demonstrated how, even in the face of motivated reasoning, people can change their
attitudes towards their preferred candidates (see Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson
2010). These kinds of reasons are important to explore further as they pertain to
attitudinal stability, but the analytical approach of this chapter focuses more on trait-level
explanations for attitudinal instability. Examining explanations such as the affective
tipping point are best suited for research designs that allow for the exploration of how
specific tallies are acquired and how those tallies accumulate and lead to attitudinal shifts.
Direction of Attitudinal Change
Many scholars examining the direction of attitudinal change over the lifespan
focus solely on the role age plays with shaping political attitudes (Dangelis, Hardy, and
Cutler 2007; Glenn 1974). However, there have been a handful of studies which have
examined how life events and other forces of socialization work to shape the direction of
attitude change. Examining how the Vietnam War shaped political attitudes, Erikson and
Stoker (2011) found draft numbers to be predictive of change in liberal and more
Democratic directions. In particular, they found those who had lower draft numbers,
meaning those who had the greatest likelihood of being involuntarily drafted into the war
effort, were more likely than those with higher draft numbers to move in a persistently
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liberal direction. Recent work on the effect of the Great Recession of 2008 showed
economic troubles during the recession caused attitudes towards welfare to improve only
to go back to normal when the economic situation rebounded (Margalit 2013). Here again
we can see that the direction of change in going to be dependent on the context of the
socializing event. The literature sets out clear expectations which I will illuminate below.

5.3 Hypotheses
In my analyses, I examined the roles of five of the forces discussed above.
Specifically, I examined effects for inertia, role acquisition, status mobility, changing
peer influences, and psychological forces. These forces are expected to drive both the
likelihood of change and the direction of any change that does occur. From here I will
discuss how I examined these factors and my expectations for each. The force of
attitudinal inertia, for instance, is typically defined as the ability to predict an attitude at
any point in the future by knowing what said attitude is in the present. If inertia shapes
our attitudes and I am a conservative today, then I will be a conservative tomorrow, next
month, and next year. In the second chapter I demonstrated the power of inertia, as
political attitudes are defined by stability throughout the lifespan. Inertia in the social
sciences is typically defined in such a way. Here, however, my definition of inertia will
be defined in a way more similar to physics.
Given no change by an external force, an object (here defined as an attitude)
should remain in a constant state of motion in a straight line. If that object is acted upon
by an external force, it will continue along its altered trajectory in a constant state of
motion in a straight line. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that attitudes do not exist
in a vacuum, and holding an attitude about one issue is likely to predict a host of other
issues. So, when I discuss inertia in this chapter, I do so in a way that suggests the
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stability of one issue attitude should predict stability of other issue attitudes. When
external forces induce attitudinal change and the trajectory (i.e. the direction) of an
attitude is altered, I expect the trajectories of other issue attitudes to change in the same
direction. In my analyses, I use the group classifications associated with other attitudes to
predict both the existence and direction of attitudinal change for whichever variable I am
examining. For the sake of brevity, I will refer to this factor as inertia throughout the
chapter.
In terms of role acquisition, I focus solely on familial role acquisition, specifically
changes in marital status as well as becoming a parent. Healy and Malhotra’s (2013)
work on how sisters make young men more likely to hold socially conservative opinions
and to identify as Republican is instructive here. Namely, it is possible to see how
changing family dynamics can lead to changing attitudes. In the models, I run for role
acquisition I examine the effects of divorce in 1982, divorce in 1997, years married, the
number of daughters a person had in 1982, and the number of sons a person had in 1982.
I expect both parenthood and drastic changes in marital status (i.e. divorce) to be
negatively correlated with stability, as these are events which could arguably cause
people to reconsider their political beliefs. Gendered family roles, as discussed by Healy
and Malhotra, should also lead any change to be in a conservative direction.
For status mobility, I created four separate measures of upward and downward
social mobility. These measures track changes in relative affluence between the years of
1973 and 1982 as well as between 1982 and 1997. In part, the expectations of these
variables are rooted in conventional wisdom. Conservative shifts as people grow older
are regularly attributed to upward social mobility. The idea being, of course, that with
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increased income comes increased tax bills, and with increased tax bills comes eroding
support for governmental assistance programs. However, improved standing in society
could lead to no change at all. If a person’s actions and attitudes have led them to levels
of relative prosperity, what motivation would they have to reevaluate their actions and
attitudes? Downward social mobility should work in the reverse, as rougher economic
circumstances should lead people to rely on governmental assistance programs thus
increasing support for government and liberal principles. This process of losing wealth
should cause people to reevaluate their attitudes and actions. As such, I expect upward
social mobility to be positively associated with attitudinal stability, but when change does
occur and the conventional wisdom is correct, then we should see upward social mobility
to lead to a more conservative outlook. Downward social mobility, on the other hand,
should be negatively associated with attitudinal stability and negatively related to change
in a conservative direction.
For changing peer influences I examined the role of three aspects—moving to a
new region of the United States, attending college by 1973, and serving in the military by
1973. I created two variables representing people who moved to the South between 1973
and 1997 as well as one for people who moved out of the South between 1973 and 1997.
For each of these, I would expect negative relationships for change if the conventional
wisdom holds. However, a college education may make people less susceptible to
change, and it could very likely have a positive relationship with stability, as
knowledgeable people are more likely to remain adamant in their beliefs (Taber and
Lodge 2006). Moving to the South should make people more conservative. Moving out
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of the South should make people more liberal. College should make people more liberal,
and military service should make people more conservative.
Finally, the psychological factors I explore in this chapter are not like the
personality dispositions I examined in the last chapter. For these variables, I used
baseline levels from 1973 as my unit for analyses. This process is unlike the one I used to
created change variables pertaining to status mobility and moving across country but is
more like the process I used to measure role acquisition. These baseline levels of traits in
1973 like self-confidence, opinion strength, personal trust, political trust, internal political
efficacy, external political efficacy, and political knowledge should have the greatest
influence on patterns of attitudinal stability between 1973 and 1997. I would expect all of
these traits—especially opinion strength, internal political efficacy, and political
knowledge—to be positively associated with attitudinal stability. As for the direction,
there are no clear expectations for the direction these traits would predispose people
towards. I would make an exception for political trust. Given the positive relationship
between liberalism and support for governmental interventions, I would expect this trait
to perhaps lead towards liberal shifts over time.

5.4 Data and Methods
The data for this chapter again come from the MSS and from the latent class
models I ran in the second chapter. To reiterate, these data were collected across four
waves between the years 1965 and 1997. In 1965, researchers contacted high school
seniors and their parents. The researchers then recontacted these students and their
parents in 1973 and 1982. In 1997, the researchers reinterviewed the students, who by
that time were 50 years old, and they also interviewed the children of that original student
sample. For the purposes of the analyses here, I will again only focus on that original
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student sample which was interviewed across all four time points.
The results of the latent class analyses in the second chapter will serve as the
dependent variables for my analyses in this chapter. In particular, I will use logistic
regression models to examine which variables are associated with group membership
across four political attitudes—political ideology, party identification, minority
assistance, and women’s role in society. These attitudes were chosen because the first
two are broad political attitudes, and the other two are specific issue attitudes defined by
separate patterns of change. Specifically, minority assistance is defined by a conservative
pattern of change, and women’s role in society is defined by a liberal pattern of change.
For each issue attitude, there are five possible group classifications. Three of these
classifications—Stay Conservative, Stay Moderate, and Stay Liberal—are groups defined
by relative stability. The other two classifications—Move Conservative and Move
Liberal—are defined by their patterns of directional instability. Not every attitude has
people represented in all five groups. In fact, only ideology has people in all five
categories. The remaining attitudes have people in four of the five possible groups.
Neither party identification nor minority assistance had people in the Stay Moderate
group, and the women’s role in society attitude had no people in the Stay Conservative
group. A breakdown of group membership can be found in Table 5.1.
To explain the likelihoods of individual group membership I will use a variety of
variables in the MSS data set as well as the group classifications of other variables
calculated in the second chapter. There are five major classifications for the variables I
will use to predict group membership—inertia, role acquisition, status mobility, changing
peer influences, and psychological. In terms of inertia, I will use the group classifications
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associated with other attitudes examined in Chapter 2. It should follow that change or
stability across one political attitude should predict change or stability across another.
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I define role acquisition in purely familial terms. Specifically, I will examine the
influence of divorce, years married, and the number of sons or daughters as potential
predictors of change. In terms of status mobility, I created four dummy coded variables
each utilizing a cutoff of the equivalent of $100,000 in 1997 as a measure of wealth.13
Two variable accounts for people who went from relative rags to relative riches with one
covering the period between 1973 and 1982 and the other covering the period between
1982 and 1997, and the other two variables account for people who went in the other
direction. Changing peer influences will be measured by looking at people who moved
from the North to the South and vice versa, as well as military service and attending
college. I will also examine more psychologically pertinent variables as they were
measured in 1973 such as political interest, self-confidence, opinion strength, personal
trust, political trust, internal political efficacy, and external political efficacy.
Again, I will use logistic regression models to run my analyses, as this method is
preferable when examining discrete nominal dependent variables such as the group
classifications associated with each political attitude. For each issue attitude, I will run
three sets of logistic analyses. The first set of analyses examine the likelihood of being in
one of the three possible categories defined by stability versus being in one of the two
categories defined by change. As such, I coded a dummy to equal one if a person was in a
stable category and zero if they were in a labile category. These analyses allow me to
examine which factors lead to stability more broadly. After I ran these analyses, I then
ran two sets of models predicting the direction of change. For one, I coded every person

13

Roughly $60,000 in 1982 and $20,000 in 1973. Estimates were calculated with the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics inflation calculator found here:
http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=100%2C000.00&year1=1997&year2=1965
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in the Move Conservative category for a given attitude as a one and everybody else as a
zero. For the other, I coded every person in the Move Liberal category as a one and
everybody else as a zero.

5.5 Results
The first set of attitudes I examined were those surrounding placements on the
seven-point ideology scale. Six models examining the stability of this placement are
presented in Table 5.2. The first five models represent the five basic groupings of
variables—inertia, role acquisition, status mobility, changing peer influences, and
psychological factors, and the sixth model is a full model which includes all the
previously explored in the prior models. Every model controlled for the race and gender
of the respondents. Results for these analyses, and all analyses from here on out, are
reported as odds ratios.
Odds ratios significantly higher than one indicate that particular variable
increased the likelihood of an outcome—here being categorized as stable—while odds
ratios significantly lower than one indicate that particular variable decreased the
likelihood of an outcome. Odds ratios have an advantage in that they are readily
interpreted so that however higher or lower an odds ratio is, the odds ratio tells us how
much more or less likely an outcome is for every unit change in a given variable when
holding all other variables constant. For instance, a significant odds ratio of 1.79 would
indicate that for every unit change for that given variable the odds of the outcome
occurring increase by 79 percent; whereas, a significant odds ratio of 0.80 would indicate
that for every unit change in that given variable the odds of the outcome occurring
decrease by 20 percent.
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In the first model presented in Table 5.2 I present the results for how stability
across three other political attitudes—party identification, minority assistance, and
women’s role in society—predict the stability of ideological identification. Each variable
was coded as one if a person was in a stable category for that variable and zero if they
were not. Stability of attitudes towards party identification (OR = 2.41, 95% CI (1.66,
3.49), p <.01) were all positively associated with the likelihood of being stable regarding
ideological identification. However, this is the only variable with any explanatory power
across all six models presented in Table 5.2.
To indicate what these results truly mean regarding the probability of being in a
stable ideology category, the predicted probability of being stable for ideology is .79 (95
% CI [.76, .83], p < .01) for people who were stable for party identification. So, if a
person was in a stable party identification category, then there is a nearly 80 percent
chance that they would be in a stable ideology category. However, people in labile party
identification categories had a predicted probability of being in a stable ideology category
of .62 (95 % CI [.55, .69], p < .001) giving them a roughly sixty percent chance of being
stable ideologically. These findings are as I expected. Stability in one attitude is
positively predicted by stability in other attitudes. These findings suggest there is a good
deal of attitudinal constraint occurring between party identification and ideology.
The next three models included variables pertaining to familial role acquisition,
status mobility, and changing peer influences. In regards in role acquisition, marital status
does not seem to play a role in the stability of political attitudes, as divorce in 1982 or
1997 or the number of years married. Neither the number of daughters a person had in
1982 nor the number of sons a person had in 1982 influenced the likelihood of
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ideological stability. Status mobility also did not seem to have as much of an effect, as
only people who were downwardly mobile between 1973 and 1982 (OR = 1.73, 95% CI
(0.88, 3.72), p = .183) came close to showing an effect, and that is a bit of a stretch.
The null findings keep on coming through the changing peer influences and
psychological factors models. The overall number of null findings is staggering here
given the overall expectations I laid out earlier. Taking on new roles in life, moving up or
down socioeconomically, moving new places, going to college, joining the military, and
having a psychological attachment to politics should in theory drive people to become
likely to change throughout their lifespan. The full model for predicting ideological
stability did not change the lack of influence for these variables. The effects for party
identification stability (OR = 2.46, 95% CI (1.68, 3.62), p < .01) remained, and no other
variables became significant when controlling for other variables and factors.
There is a pressing question as to why I did not find the effects I was expecting.
As I will show, these null findings do not replicate across many of my other analyses, and
sociological factors do predict patterns of stability associated with the other three political
attitudes I examine. It is possible there is something about a person calling themselves a
liberal or conservative that is immune from the explanatory variables employed here, but
I doubt this possibility is the case. I do not have the space here to examine possible
interaction effects, but it is also possible that the effects of these phenomena differ across
populations. For instance, given gendered expectations, men may be more likely than
women to change because of changes in family role or social status. As I will show, there
is still much to explore regarding how these forces work to shape political attitudes over
the lifespan.
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I then examined the factors relating to the direction of ideological change. Again,
these analyses I present in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 examine only those people who were in
either the Move Conservative or Move Liberal categories relative to all other categories,
and I use the models to predict the likelihoods of moving in a conservative or liberal
direction versus being in any other categories. In Table 5.3 I start by examining the
likelihood of a person being in the Move Conservative category relative to any of the four
other categories. Here, much like the previous findings, there does not seem to be much
going on in any of the six models outside of some expected effects regarding the
influence of party identification (OR = 4.46, 95% CI (2.92, 6.83), p < .01) and minority
assistance (OR = 1.64, 95% CI (0.99, 2.70), p < .10) categorization. Unlike the previous
analyses, where I examined the influence of being a in a stable category for these variable
on the likelihood of being in a stable category for ideology, I am here examining how
being in the Move Conservative category for these variables influences the likelihood of
being in the Move Conservative category for ideology.
The models predicting liberal change do see some sociological influence. Again,
there is not a whole lot going on with these models, and the finding of party identification
(OR = 6.13, 95% CI (1.71, 19.19), p < .01) remains as strong as ever. However, an effect
for being divorced in 1997 is found in both the role acquisition submodel (OR = 3.77,
95% CI (1.13, 14.14), p < .01) as well as in the full model (OR = 4.91, 95% CI (1.32,
20.88), p < .05). Non-divorced people had nearly 3 percent probability (95 % CI [.01,
.04], p < .01) of becoming liberal, but divorced people had an 11 percent chance (95 %
CI [.01, .22], p < .05) of becoming liberal, a staggering feat given only 3.7 percent of the
sample were in the Move Liberal category.
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Moving to the stability and direction of change for party identification, I present
the models predicting the stability and direction of party identification in Tables 5.5, 5.6,
and 5.7. The factors predicting the stability of party identification are much like those
predicting the stability of ideology in that there are not many. However, there is more
going on in these three sets of models when compared to the last three sets of models. In
the first five models predicting the stability of party identification presented in Table 5.5
there are effects for ideological stability (OR = 2.00, 95% CI (1.44, 2.79), p < .01),
military service (OR = 1.35, 95% CI (0.95, 1.91), p < .15), and internal efficacy (OR =
1.31, 95% CI (1.02, 1.67), p < .05), and each of these factors predicts an increased
likelihood of stability.
In the full model the effects of military service and internal efficacy disappear
with only the effect of party identification stability (OR = 1.90, 95% CI (1.35, 2.68), p <
.01) remaining. However, something interesting happens in the full model. The trait of
self-confidence attains a level of marginal significance when all other variables are
accounted for (OR = 0.91, 95% CI (0.82, 1.01), p < .10). This finding is not expected. If
anything, we should expect to see self-confidence being predictive of increased
attitudinal instability. Instead, self-confident people are slightly less likely to have stable
party identifications over time. As I will show in the next analyses, self-confidence does
not incline people to choose one party over the other nor does it make people less stable
with any other attitude. It is very possible that this finding is an artifact of the model, as it
does not seem to replicate elsewhere and is a marginal finding to begin with.
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In Table 5.6 I present the results of the analyses predicting the likelihood of being
in the Move Republican category. The first three models do not show much as there is
only an effect in the first model for ideological movement (OR = 4.42, 95% CI (2.82,
6.32), p < .01). This finding is particularly large and remains relatively unchanged in the
full model (OR = 4.40, 95% CI (2.90, 6.67), p < .01). This effect is not particularly
surprising, but the magnitude of conservative ideological movement effect is quite large
increasing the likelihood of being in the Move Republican category nearly four-and-ahalf times over. Altogether 17 percent of people were in the Move Republican category,
but people who moved conservative ideologically had a 37 percent chance of also being
in the Move Republican party identification category (95% CI [.30, .44]) while people
who were not in the Move Conservative ideology category only had a 13 percent chance
of being in the Move Republican party identification category (95% CI [.10, .15]).
Beyond this expected, but large effect, the peer influences and psychological
factors models each had a significant predictor. People who moved out of the South were
significantly more likely to be in the Move Republican category (OR = 2.50, 95% CI
(0.98, 5.92), p < .05). This finding makes a good deal of sense. During much the period
covered in this study conservative Democrats still ruled throughout the Deep South,
conservative Southern Democrats who moved north would likely have found more in
common with their new Republican neighbors than their Democratic neighbors. Internal
efficacy also predicted the likelihood of being in the Move Republican category (OR =
0.74, 95% CI (0.57, 0.97), p < .05), but increased levels of internal efficacy negatively
predicted being in the Move Republican category. This finding is in line with my overall
expectations, as internal efficacy is associated with political trust which in turn should
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lead to more support for governmental programs. Both effects held up relatively
unchanged in the full model.
Predicting location in the Move Democratic category tells a similar but slightly
reversed story. As I have shown with every model up to this point, ideological movement
is very predictive of party identification movement in the reduced (OR = 6.16, 95% CI
(1.93, 16.68), p < .01) as well as the full (OR = 5.82, 95% CI (1.60, 18.60), p < .01)
models. There are no effects to speak of in the reduced role acquisition, status mobility,
or peer influences models. In the reduced psychological factors model, however, there are
effects for both political trust (OR = 1.32, 95% CI (1.02, 1.71), p < .05) and political
knowledge (OR = 4.88, 95% CI (1.05, 25.59), p < .05) with both being associated with a
higher likelihood of landing somebody in the Move Democratic category. I had expected
political trust to be associated with movement in a liberal direction. So, that finding is not
all that surprising, but the effect of political knowledge is somewhat unexpected but
understandable. Those most understanding of the political world are those who are most
likely to comfortable with the apparatuses and machinations of politics and the
government, and comfort with the government is a trait typically associated with more
liberal and Democratic voters.
The next two attitudes—minority assistance and women’s role in society—are
different from the previous two attitudes as they are specific issue attitudes rather than
general group identifications. Minority assistance is the first of these two issue attitudes I
examined, and the results for my analyses surrounding the stability and direction of
minority assistance attitudes can be found in Tables 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10. There are
significant effects in three of the first five models. Inertia was surprisingly not a predictor
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of minority assistance attitudinal stability. These null findings suggest whatever change
ongoing with minority assistance attitudes is not being constrained by ideology, party
identification, and attitudes about the role of women in society. However, as I have
shown and will show, the direction of change associated with minority both shapes the
direction of change on other attitudes and is also affected by the direction of change on
other attitudes. These findings are intriguing as they suggest attitudes towards help
minority groups change because of nonpolitical forces, but the change associated with
these nonpolitical forces may also lead to increasingly conservative views on ideology
and, as I will show later, attitudes towards women’s role in society. I cannot test the
causal direction of these relationships here, but I am suggesting that increased racial
conservatism may drive increased conservatism more broadly.
In the other models, there are effects for divorce in 1982 (OR = 0.62, 95% CI
(0.38, 1.03), p < .10), the number of sons (OR = 0.80, 95% CI (0.65, 0.99), p < .05),
moving out of the South (OR = 0.41, 95% CI (0.18, 0.97), p < .05), college education
(OR = 1.61, 95% CI (0.99, 2.63), p < .10), internal political efficacy (OR = 0.76, 95% CI
(0.58, 0.99), p < .05), and political knowledge (OR = 2.33, 95% CI (0.98, 5.60), p < .01).
Of these factors, both college education and political knowledge were, as I expected
drivers of attitudinal stability. The negative finding for internal efficacy runs counter to
my expectations, as I assumed its close relationship with traits like political knowledge
would make it a force of stabilization, but as I will show later it worked to make people
more conservative on the issue of minority assistance.
Divorce, changing parental roles, and moving were all expectedly drivers of
attitudinal instability. Of these, the finding regarding moving out of the South is the most
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interesting and warrants further examination and discussion. Earlier, when I was
examining the patterns of stability surrounding party identification, I showed how
moving out of the South increased the likelihood of a person being placed in the Move
Republican category. However, here I show that moving out the South also makes people
more likely to change their opinions about minority assistance. The troubled nature
surrounding the history of race in the United States is rarely more apparent than when the
history of the South is examined. So, of all issue attitudes, I would expect these variables
focusing on movement in and out of the region to have the biggest influence. This finding
is far more intriguing when compared with the results in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 which
display my analyses surrounding the direction of change associated with minority
assistance. Moving out of the South was not more likely to make people more
conservative towards minority assistance, but moving out of the South was associated
with movement in a liberal direction regarding minority assistance (OR = 5.28, 95% CI
(1.07, 19.94), p < .05). It is very likely that moving out of the South introduces these
former southerners to newer racial norms that they must in turn adopt to fit in.
Beyond the changing peer influences of moving out of the South, there are
inertial, role acquisition, status mobility, and psychological effects driving the likelihoods
of becoming conservative or liberal about minority assistance. Becoming more likely to
identify as conservative (OR = 1.69, 95% CI (1.03, 2.72), p < .05) and becoming more
conservative about women’s role in society (OR = 2.29, 95% CI (1.13, 4.37), p < .05)
were both associated with increased conservatism regarding minority assistance. I
discussed these relationships earlier, and I will spend more time in the conclusion
working these relationships out.
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In addition to these inertial forces, both the number of sons a person has (OR =
1.27, 95% CI (0.99, 1.61), p < .10) and internal political efficacy (OR = 1.35, 95% CI
(1.00, 1.83), p < .10) also acted in ways that made people more conservative about
minority assistance. I would be interested to see the reason why the number of sons a
person has would make them more likely to move in a conservative direction on this
issue. It might be possible that sons act to increase levels of authoritarianism or social
dominance which in turn are more predictive of increasing conservatism on the issue of
minority assistance. The finding regarding sons holds up in the full model but is
weakened relative to the reduced role acquisition model. I would imagine there is another
set of variables, again like authoritarianism or social dominance orientation, that mediate
or moderate this relationship.
I already discussed the liberalizing effect of moving out of the South, but being
divorced in 1997 (OR = 2.86, 95% CI (0.92, 9.49), p < .10) and downward social
mobility (OR = 4.22, 95% CI (1.58, 10.09), p < .01) were also associated with
liberalizing attitudes about minority assistance. The financial stress associated with
divorce may make people more tolerant towards governmental assistance. Similarly, as I
expected downward social mobility should predict attitudes which are more tolerant
towards governmental assistance. Here I show this expectation applies to the issue of
minority assistance. The inverse, upward social mobility, also had an expected effect (OR
= 0.46, 95% CI (0.20, 1.00), p < .10) in that it negatively predicted the likelihood of
being in the Move Liberal category for minority assistance.
In the final sets of analyses, I examined the stability and direction of attitudes
pertaining to women’s role in society. The models predicting the stability and direction of
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these attitudes can be found in Tables 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13. In Table 5.11 I present the
results examining the stability of attitudes about women’s role in society. There were
effects found in four of the first five models. However, this issue seems to be an issue
which was not well predicted by forces of inertia, as, much like minority assistance, the
stability of this issue does not seem to be predicated on the stability of other issues. The
lack of effects for the other forces of inertia suggests that change and stability on this
particular issue was not constrained much by political forces. Given the more social
nature of this issue, these findings may not be all that surprising.
In the other four models, effects were found for the number of daughters (OR =
0.67, 95% CI (0.54, 0.84), p < .01), the number of sons (OR = 0.63, 95% CI (0.51, 0.79),
p < .01), downward social mobility between 1973 and 1982 (OR = 2.67, 95% CI (1.07,
8.96), p < .10), upward social mobility between the years 1982 and 1997 (OR = 1.79,
95% CI (1.21, 2.67), p < .01), military service (OR = 2.74, 95% CI (1.86, 4.05), p < .01),
self-confidence (OR = 1.12, 95% CI (1.00, 1.25), p < .05), opinion strength (OR = 1.18,
95% CI (1.05, 1.32), p < .01), and political trust (OR = 0.85, 95% CI (0.72, 0.99), p <
.05). Of these effects, which I will discuss further, the biggest surprises are those of the
downward status mobility predicting increased levels of stability and political trust
predicting patterns of instability. I expected downward mobility to lead to overall levels
of instability across all issue attitudes, and I expected trust to predict levels of stability
across all attitudes. However, it is likely these effects which were found in their
respective reduced models were mediated by other variables as neither variable is a
significant predictor of stability patterns in the full model.
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The findings regarding the role of children were expected. Of the attitudes
examined in this chapter, this attitude would be the strongest candidate for demonstrating
significant familial effects influencing its patterns of stability. It seems as though
parenthood works to redefine gender roles in the family as having sons and daughters
leads to more instability with attitudes regarding the role of women in society. The effect
of upward social mobility was neither expected nor unexpected, but it is interesting to see
it have the stabilizing effect that it does. If this is an effect of more homes having dual
incomes during the years of 1982 and 1997 thus more families remaining comfortable
with the idea of women working outside of the home, remains to be seen. The strong
effect of political knowledge is also interesting, as it is more predictive here than
anywhere else.
Predicting the direction of attitudinal shifts (results in Tables 5.12 and 5.13)
regarding women’s role in society came up with many interesting predictors. Starting
with people who moved in a conservative on the issue of women’s role in society there
are some interesting relationships pertaining to how changing family roles increase or
decrease the likelihood of moving in a conservative on this issue. Divorced people in
1997 were significantly less likely to be in the Move Conservative category for this issue
(OR = 0.25, 95% CI (0.05, 0.80), p < .05) while the number of sons (OR = 1.71, 95% CI
(1.26, 2.31), p < .01) and daughters (OR = 1.39, 95% CI (1.00, 1.89), p < .05) were
positive predictors for increased conservatism.
These findings buttress and further the claims of Healy and Malhotra (2013).
There seems to be some gendered process within families which leads to more socially
conservative issue attitudes over time. There is also a significant effect for the direction
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of change associated with minority assistance (OR = 2.22, 95% CI (1.10, 4.20), p < .05).
Coupled with the results of analyzing the likelihood of becoming more conservative on
minority assistance, these findings are of particular interest and importance. Recall, the
number of sons also positively predicted the likelihood of becoming more conservative
towards minority assistance. Just as with minority assistance, increasing levels of
authoritarianism or SDO could also be predicting increased conservatism regarding the
role of women in society.
Conversely, an examination of the factors leading to increased liberalism towards
the role of women shows that the number of sons (OR = 1.39, 95% CI (1.00, 1.89), p <
.05) and daughters (OR = 1.39, 95% CI (1.00, 1.89), p < .05) also increase the likelihood
of being in the Move Liberal category relative to any other category. So, there is a tale of
two cities going on here, and it is indisputable that children change gender expectations
in interesting ways. I will discuss these results further in the conclusion, the reasoning
behind these seemingly contradictory results likely lie in moderating or mediating
relationships which will remain analytically unexplored here.
In addition to a potential liberalizing effect of children, there were a number of
psychological factors which influenced the likelihood of liberalization. Political trust
increased the likelihood of liberalizing attitudes (OR = 1.25, 95% CI (1.00, 1.56), p <
.05) while self-confidence (OR = 0.85, 95% CI (0.73, 0.98), p < .05), opinion strength
(OR = 0.79, 95% CI (0.67, 0.91), p < .01), and political knowledge (OR = 0.14, 95% CI
(0.04, 0.53), p < .01) all negatively predicted the likelihood of liberalizing change. These
results are not very expected, but the simplest explanation is that extreme liberal stability
marked the issue of women’s roles, in fact it is the only attitude without a Stay
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Conservative category, and this extreme liberal stability is really what is being predicted
by these variables. As I already demonstrated, these factors are not predictive of
conservative change but are very much associated with stability.

5.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In the theory section of this chapter I outlined six possible sources of attitudinal
stability as they were laid out by Dinas (2013). These six sources—inertia, role
acquisition, changing peer influences, social mobility, stratification of experience, and
identity diffusion—have been used in the past to understand how and why people stick
with their prior attitudes and move on to new ones. I added psychological dispositions as
a seventh possible source. In prior studies, attitudinal stability had been measured through
correlations across time with panel data or as a continuous variable in cross-sectional
designs. Here I was able to use discrete categories based on observed patterns of change
in order to uniquely identify the sources of stability and the direction of change when
lability occurs. This method allowed me to examine the degree to which the seven
possible sources of attitudinal stability stack up with each other to predict differing
patterns of stability. So, how did they stack with each other?
Inertia Predicts Some but Not All
I had expected inertia would play a significant role in the shaping of political
attitudes. Specifically, I argued the trajectory of one attitude would predict the trajectory
of other attitudes. Stable attitudes would predict other stable attitudes, and labile attitudes
would predict the direction of other labile attitudes. The results for this influence and
were strongest when I examined the degree to which ideology and party identification
constrain each other. Interestingly, patterns of stability for party identification and
ideology did not do much to constrain the policy specific question of minority assistance
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or the social value specific question of women’s role in society. The only such constraints
I found were an effect for conservative ideological change which predicted conservative
change towards minority assistance and the reverse effect for predicting conservative
movement for the ideology item. Outside of these two constraints there are no inertial
constraints of party identification and ideology on the stability of minority assistance and
women’s role attitudes, nor are there constraints predicting liberal movement on these
items. Conservative change on women’s role and minority assistance did constrain each
other, however, suggest a role for social conservatism which goes on outside of party and
ideology.
Family Makes Us Conservative (But Maybe Also Liberal)
Through the first two attitudes—party identification and ideology—familial role
acquisition did not predict much in terms of stability patterns. Divorce in 1997 did
positively predict movement in a liberal direction for ideology, but outside of this sole
effect, family does not seem to shape identification with party or ideology. However,
when it came to the minority assistance and women’s role attitudes, these changing
family role variables became significantly more predictive of stability patterns. Although
there were some effects of divorce here, the number of sons and daughters were
predictive of attitudinal lability for these attitudes. The more interesting findings come
when examining the degree to which the number of sons and daughters influenced the
direction of change. Sons made people more conservative vis-à-vis both issues while the
number of daughters only predicted more conservative attitudes towards women’s role in
society.
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However, the issue of women’s role in society drives a wrench into the idea that
these are solely conservatizing processes, as the number of sons and daughters are also
positively associated with the likelihood of moving in a liberal direction toward these
issues. Earlier I discussed how these disparate results could simply be indicative of
children leading to change writ large, and these effects are due to comparing these change
variables with stable attitudes. In fact, a further reduced model examining only the
differences between those who moved liberal versus those who moved conservative
showed children did not predict movement for one over the other. However, the question
becomes why do children cause some people to become liberal and other people to
become conservative? One possible explanation is the existence of mediation from some
other variable. In preliminary analyses examining the differences between those who
moved liberal versus those who moved conservative on the issue of women’s role I found
an interesting interaction between the number of sons and daughters.
I plotted this interaction in Figure 5.1. Here I show how the number of sons
interacts with the number of daughters to predict differing probabilities of moving in a
conservative direction towards women’s rights issues. In a family with no daughters each
successive son predicts increased conservatism, but in a family with four daughters each
successive son predicts a lower likelihood of moving in a conservative direction. There
could be a variety of processes at work here. It could simply be that large families with
many sons and daughters require a more equal distribution of familial obligations
between husband and wife, or it could mean that male dominated households engender
socially conservative values through authoritarianism or SDO.
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Status Mobility and Changing Peer Influences
Outside of stability for women’s role and minority assistance attitudes status
mobility and changing peer influences did not predict the stability of attitudes as I
expected. However, when people did change, these variables tended to have a larger role
predicting the direction of attitudinal change. Of these variables moving out of the South
seemed to have biggest effect across issues, as it predicted both instability and the
direction of change for some attitudes. People who moved out the south were more likely
to move to the Republican Party, less stable regarding minority assistance, and more
likely to become more liberal towards minority assistance. These findings paint an
interesting picture of how changing environments lead to different political outcomes in
complex ways.
The Psychology of it All
Political knowledge, trust, and internal efficacy were all regularly associated with
patterns of attitudinal stability, but they were not regularly associated with stability itself,
as I expected. Political knowledge, for instance, positively predicted the stability of
attitudes about women’s role in society, but I had expected in to positively predict
stability throughout. Political knowledge also decreased the likelihood of moving in
liberal or conservative directions for this issue. Much like the influence of children on
women’s role attitudes, these findings are likely a result of the strong effect political
knowledge had on the likelihood of stability for this particular issue. The ways in which
these variables affect patterns of stability likely move beyond the bounds of the main
effects presented here. The degree to which these traits interact with changing social
environments ought to be examined more in the future.
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Moving Forward
The results of this chapter and the last make a compelling argument for the
inclusion of both psychological and sociological factors in future work examining
patterns of attitudinal stability. Attitudinal instability is not the defining pattern across the
lifespan, but it is a fairly common occurrence which some people seem particularly
disposed towards. I have demonstrated how some psychological dispositions and some
sociological life events shape our patterns of attitudinal stability. The next natural step in
this process is to examine the interactions between these two forces. These interactions
likely exist, and understanding these interactions will be vital for moving our
understanding of attitudinal stability further.
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Chapter 6: Planting the Seeds of Change
6.1 What Happens to Our Dinosaur?
I began this dissertation with an illustration of a man who in his younger years
wanted to be a dinosaur. He set aside this desire and maintained a traditional,
conservative lifestyle, but when he saw his son and step-son do the same, he reminded
them to never lose their dinosaur. The scene is reminiscent of the speech George Babbitt
gives to his son at the end of Sinclair Lewis’ Babbitt. These tales reflect our intuitive
notion of how the aging process works. Age is supposed to make us more conventional
and more conservative. Among some populations, liberal, left-wing politics are akin to a
child’s desire to be a dinosaur. That is, liberal, left-wing politics are something people are
supposed to abandon once they mature and acquire more responsibilities. This process is
seen as a natural progression through adulthood. Yet, there is not much evidence that
people truly lose their dinosaur. Political attitudes in young adulthood are still predictive
of political attitudes in later years. When attitudinal change does occur, there is a
tendency towards conservatism, but liberal change, while not at a rate similar to
conservative change, occurs as well.
These patterns of change require a new understanding of how attitudes change
throughout the lifespan. Preexisting theories of attitudinal change did not account for the
direction of attitudinal change, and they did not account for individual differences in
stability patterns. In the preceding chapters, I made the case that models of attitudinal
change need to factor in both these concerns as they work to explain the phenomena. The
simple story is the same as it has ever been. People, aside for a period between the ages
of 18 and 26, are remarkably stable in their political outlooks, and even in that period of
young adulthood marked more instability, people are still largely stable. The complex
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story, however, is not as clean cut. People are more likely to shift their attitudes between
the ages of 18 and 26, but people who are higher in openness to new experiences are even
more likely to shift. Then, this higher likelihood of change for people higher in openness
begins to decrease to the point where openness predicts attitudinal intransigence after the
age of 26. This example is one of many which need to be accounted for as existed models
of attitudinal stability are revised to account for these kinds of dispositional factors which
influence the likelihood of change.

6.2 Patterns of Stability and Instability
In the second chapter, I used the Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization study to
find out if there were discernable latent classes defined by patterns of stability over the
lifespan. Across various political identities, issues, and feeling thermometers five latent
classes emerged. People stayed liberal, conservative, or moderate or they moved in
liberal or conservative directions. The MSS is a venerable public panel dataset, and to my
knowledge, I was the first to apply this particular method with this dataset. Further, I am
also the first (again to my knowledge) to examine patterns of political attitude stability in
such a way with any dataset. The method I employ is an ideal way to examine and
describe basic patterns of change across time, as it allows for the easy classification of
these patterns and the people who display those patterns. The findings here allowed us for
the first time to treat patterns of stability as an individual difference which can help to
classify groups of people.
Patterns demarcated by attitudinal stasis defined the vast majority of latent
classes, and this conclusion was the central finding of the second chapter. Beyond these
predominant patterns of stability, there were also discernable latent classes defined by
their patterns of attitudinal lability. Of these latent classes, the biggest tendency was
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towards conservatism, but, again, a not insubstantial minority moved in a more liberal
direction. Some attitudes, in a finding suggesting the domain specificity of attitudes
matters for these kinds of questions, saw the reverse pattern, as more people moved in a
liberal direction as opposed to a conservative direction. In particular, this pattern was
found when I examined the attitudes towards women’s role in society and feelings
towards black people.
The effect of attitudinal domain specificity is one I did not pay much attention to
in this dissertation, but it is something which should be examined further. Earlier I
discussed how the literature surrounding the direction of attitudinal change is mixed with
some arguing age makes people more conservative (Cornelis et al. 2009; Franssen,
Dhont, and Van Hiel 2012; Kossowska, Jasko, and Bar-Tal 2012; Tilley and Evans 2014;
Van Hiel and Brebels 2011; Wilson 1973) while others claim the opposite and argue age
makes people more liberal (Dangelis, Hardy, and Cutler 2007; Glenn 1974; Schwadel and
Garneau 2014). My findings are the first step in perhaps reconciling this disconnect in the
literature, as it appears as though people become more conservative over time in regards
to many issues but people also become more liberal over time in regards to others. Time
and data availability constraints limited my ability to push this question further, but there
certainly is some evidence to back it up.
These differing patterns of attitudinal stability are important for the overall
understanding of attitudinal change throughout the lifespan, as they suggest a one-sizefits-all approach to these questions is inadequate. Further, it suggested there are perhaps
factors beyond age which shape our overall likelihood to change attitudinally throughout
our lives. I took on this last question in the next three chapters of the dissertation, as I
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examined the heritability of stability patterns, the psychological correlates of stability
patterns, and the sociological correlates of stability patterns. I found all three of these
factors work to sway our patterns of attitudinal stability. Although it has been long
known that forces of socialization can drive attitudinal change in one direction or another,
relatively little work—I could find only one article (Bakker, Hopmann, and Persson
2015)—had been done exploring the biological and psychological roots of attitudinal
stability.
The heritability of some facets of attitudinal stability suggests there may be a
small genetic predisposition towards stability, and I argued this predisposition might be
ingrained through forces of personality. A larger twin dataset would have let me test this
proposition directly, but power issues precluded my ability to push forward with these
analyses. Data issues aside, I was able to show the ways in which personality traits
constrained patterns of attitudinal stability. Traits such as openness, conscientiousness,
and social sensitivity all predicted the relative likelihood of a person being attitudinally
labile. Again, relating these findings to the issue of context dependence and domain
specificity, these personality traits did not influence the stability of all attitude types
equally. These traits also interacted with age in ways that suggested some young adults
are more impressionable than others during their impressionable years, but this
impressionable nature gives way to inflexibility later in life.
This age by personality interaction was strongest for the trait of openness. This
finding is particularly interesting given the current political climate. People high in
openness tend to be politically liberal (Mondak 2010). A common refrain from the Right
decries the rise of the so-called “Intolerant Left”. This complaint stems from the typical
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left-wing calls for more tolerance vis-à-vis the rights of women, minority groups, and
others who are societally oppressed, but when it comes to arguments against said
tolerance, those on the left are perceived to be more intolerant of opposing viewpoints.
These findings suggest there may be something to these popular perceptions. If openness
does lead people to become entrenched in their political attitudes as they grow older, then
it should follow that tolerance of opposing political views would subsequently increase.
The existence of a main effect and the lack of an age by personality effect for
conscientiousness suggests conservatives should be no better at tolerating opposing
viewpoints.
Data availability again limited my ability to examine how personality interacts
with forces of socialization as they work to shape attitudinal stability. I was still able to
examine how life events work to influence patterns of stability over time. These findings
in the preceding chapter pointed to how the effects of family, friends, and social status
make people more or less stable in regards to their political attitudes. Of these, the
numbers of sons and daughters a person had made them less stable in regards to the
issues of minority assistance and the role of women in society. I tried to uncover the
underlying source of this finding, but I imagine more work would need to be done to see
how the number of children a person has shapes their worldview.
In the end, there was support for the four main theoretical expectations I set for
this dissertation. The typical pattern of stability over the lifespan was stasis. I found some
people were predisposed to patterns of stability while others were predisposed towards
patterns of lability. The likelihood of attitudinal stability did change because of
psychological predispositions, major life events, and as a byproduct of the aging process.
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Finally, attitudinal change was predictable and display signs indicating its patterns were
context dependent. Moving forward in this concluding chapter, I will discuss how these
results can help us to understand the political world and where this line of research
should head in the future.

6.3 Generational Implications
Attitudes are stable throughout the lifespan with some slight movement to be
expected. How does this finding help us to understand the political world? For one, it
tells us we need to pay close attention to the attitudes people hold in early adulthood, as
these are the attitudes they can expect to hold for the rest of their lives. Currently, the last
of the Millennials, the generation born to the Baby Boomers between the years of 1980
and 1994, are in this stage of development, as the youngest Millennials are currently 23years-old. The political preferences of this generation have been marked by high levels of
support for liberal political causes and with tolerance towards outgroups. For instance,
Millennial Democrats were also the strongest supporters of Bernie Sanders’ 2016 bid for
the presidency.
Some looking at the support for Bernie Sanders among younger liberals might
think this increased interest in politics rooted in democratic socialism might abate as
these young liberals age. To be sure, there likely will be a moderation of some of these
political desires, but the central tenets of Sanders’ message such as a living wage and
single-payer healthcare might not be readily abandoned by this generation. Attitudes
which are generally favorably to government intervention in the economy and
government absence from issues like LGBTQ+ Rights will likely continue in this
generation. The outlook for more conservative Millennials is murkier. The ascendency of
our unnaturally orange-colored president led nearly a quarter of Millennial Republicans
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to abandon their political party.14 This movement away from the Republican Party could
potentially damage its prospects for future success if quick changes are not made to lure
formerly Republican Millennials back to the party.
Millennials, while currently the generation du jour and the focus of thousands of
online think-pieces, are slowly on the way out of interest. Coming up behind them is
Generation Z, the generation born 1995 and after. Generation Z is just now starting to
enter young adulthood, and their outlook on life differs from the older Millennials.
Unlike Millennials, this new generation entering adulthood has never known a world
without reliable, high-speed internet or a world prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This
generation is also more fiscally conservative than Millennials.15 They are also more
socially moderate than Millennials (Hope 2016). Much has been written about how
younger voters are rejecting the divisive politics of our small-handed president, but these
effects could be due to the fact that Millennials still comprise the bulk of young voters.
This new generation, however, was actually more likely to support our current president
over Hillary Clinton.16
Some have argued alt-right figures dominate the political landscape of YouTube,
and the YouTuber who currently has the most subscribers is a nominally nonpolitical
videogame and lifestyle blogger who nonetheless is openly embraced by the neo-Nazi
community for his brand of anti-Semitic and misogynistic humor.17 The members of
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http://www.people-press.org/2017/05/17/partisan-identification-is-sticky-but-about-10switched-parties-over-the-past-year/
15
http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-chart-of-the-generations-and-gen-z2015-12?r=UK&IR=T
16
http://hispanicheritage.org/50000-generation-z-high-school-students-identifyrepublican/
17
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/why-the-right-is-dominating-youtube
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Generation Z have been raised on YouTube content (Hope 2016). The socialization
brought on by YouTube may be leading this younger generation towards far-right politics
or at the very least far-right tolerant politics. Whether this shift is due to the elite-level
failures which led to economic disaster, or if there are genuine feelings of outgroup
animosity among this generation, remains to be seen. Regardless, there seems to be a
general understanding that younger generations will always be more liberal than older
generations, but as I have shown in my analyses here and with current observations of
Generation Z, this pattern does not always exist. In fact, there are historic examples of
this fact. Adolf Hitler, for instance, found his most vocal and active electoral support
from younger Germans who were voting for the first time (Evans 2005). By no means am
I trying to say this new generation will help to bring on fascist rule in the United States,
but it simply goes to show that the attitudes of this newer generation should be listened
to, as these attitudes, if crystalized in the next decade or so, will shape Generation Z’s
outlooks for decades to come.
If, as some suggest, authoritarian attitudes among the left and right are on the rise,
then this development is troubling. Authoritarian attitudes, which can be as seemingly
benign as not valuing political compromise and as severe as advocating political
violence, could be taking a foothold among the youth of America. The generations born
after 1980 have always known an increasingly hyper-partisan political environment. The
oldest of these generations can count the partisanship-drive Bill Clinton impeachment as
one of their earliest political memories. Knowing nothing else but partisan rancor, it
becomes difficult to find common cause with those on the opposite side of the political
spectrum thus leading to further animosity. In light of recent events, such as the recent
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incident involving a gunman attempting to murder Republican members of Congress
while they practiced baseball, there is a growing perception that acts of political violence
are on the rise. Some in the media have attributed these kinds of events to a growing
feeling that traditional democratic processes are no longer effective due to partisan
forces. If these events become more common or, Heaven forbid, more accepted, then it
becomes difficult, given the findings I presented, for us to find ways to counteract these
dangerous attitudes.
The nature of changing attitudes across the lifespan suggests the attitudes of
Millennials and Generation Z are likely to remain similar throughout their lives. Yet, now
is the time when we should see the attitudes of these groups being most labile. The
Republican Party might fret because a quarter of millennial conservatives left the party,
but there was also similar movement away from the Republican Party following
Watergate during these impressionable years in the MSS data, but this movement was
short-lived and support returned to the Republican Party. Furthermore, there will also be
some in these generations who will continue to undergo attitudinal change well past
young adulthood. Political operatives who would like to change the demographic fortunes
of their parties should heed this knowledge. Identifying those who are most likely to
change attitudinally, a process made relatively easy in our age of Big Data, can help
target messaging to voters in more efficient ways.

6.4 Why a Conservative Shift?
Throughout this dissertation, my claim has been that attitudes are remarkably
stable throughout the lifespan. Yet, when attitudes do change, there is a decidedly
conservative shift even though there are significant numbers of people who change in a
liberal direction. There are two possible explanations which would require more data to
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answer. The first possibility is that the observed conservative shift is a product of the
times. In the second chapter I found the strongest evidence for this conservative shift
while using the MSS data, and I did not examine the question with the Australian data.
The Reagan Revolution took place during the time period covered by the MSS. Reagan’s
presidency led to the demonization of the liberal label, and it is possible this specific
event led to the observed conservative shift. If this possibility is the correct proposition,
then there is nothing inherent to the aging process that would lead people to be more
likely to shift in a conservative direction. Adding credence to this idea are the findings in
Chapter 5. When I examined the personality correlates associated with the direction of
attitudinal change, I did not find any factors positively associated with change in a
conservative direction. In fact, these traits were more likely to predict change in a liberal
direction.
There is a second possibility, however, as the conservative shift could be rooted in
some kind of internal development process. Across both samples, which were separated
by time, age, and country, men were more likely than women to display patterns of
attitudinal lability, and this lability was marked by a conservative shift. It is possible the
folk wisdom suggesting a conservatizing effect of age is truer for men than it is for
women. This finding suggests the conservatizing effect of age is somewhat rooted in
developmental differences between men and women. During the period of time these
changes are most likely to occur, the brain is still in a period of development. This
development leads people to become less likely to engage in risky or novelty seeking
behaviors (Johnson, Blum, and Giedd 2009). As people become more routinized as a
result of the developmental processes, it is possible they are led to a more conventional
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and conservative lifestyle. However, it is also possible that these neurodevelopmental
processes simply act as a force of attitudinal crystallization and lead people to stay as
they were following a brief period of instability.
In all, much as the results pointed, I imagine the muted yet observed conservative
shift over the lifespan is a product of biological and environmental factors. The process
of attitudinal crystallization while certainly influenced by external forces is almost
certainly the product of biological forces. This fact is evidenced by the high degree of
attitudinal immutability after crystallization takes place. If attitudes were purely
influenced by environmental factors, then they would likely be more susceptible to
change. However, attitudes can still change as people grow older, and these changes are
attributable to environmental influences which are typically major changes to one’s life. I
imagine both these forces work in concert to lead to the slight conservative shift. The
events that lead to attitudinal shifts, such as becoming a parent, push people towards
increased desires for security which in turn could lead people toward a more conservative
outlook. The neurological changes, such as a decline of risky and/or novelty seeking
behaviors, may also work in such a way. If this conservative shift holds across time and
space, more work needs to be done to work out the mechanisms of this process.

6.5 Future Directions
Following the last section, the next steps in this research agenda are to work
towards building a new understanding of attitudes throughout the lifespan. From here, I
will first work to replicate some of the more interesting findings of this dissertation. The
finding regarding the age by openness interaction is particularly interesting. The relative
openness in young adulthood followed by immutable attitudes later in life is intriguing.
More panel data from other countries would be ideal for furthering the examination of
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this finding. I am especially curious to see how patterns of those higher in openness and
lower in conscientiousness compare with those who are lower in openness and higher in
conscientiousness. At a certain point, we would expect both to become very stable in
regards to their political attitudes, but the comparison of relative stability strength
between these two groups would be fascinating.
The stronger relationship between the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task and
attitudinal stability is another finding deserving of more examination. In particular, I
theorized the RME had this relationship on attitudinal stability because of its relationship
with prosocial behaviors. This theory poses an empirical question that could be answered
with a new round of data collection. I am proposing a panel study which tracks the RME,
prosocial behaviors, and political attitudes. This design would allow me to see if the
relationship between the RME and attitudinal stability replicates, and it would also allow
me to see if the relationship between the RME and attitudinal stability is mediated by
prosocial behaviors more broadly.
Although I was able to complete some heritability analyses, I was limited in my
ability to run all of the analyses I was hoping to run. Specifically, my assumption of a
shared genetic pathway between personality traits and patterns of attitudinal stability still
needs to be tested with genetically relevant data. In order to run the analyses required for
testing my assumption, a longitudinal twin dataset with both attitudinal data and
personality data with at least 1,000 twin pairs would be needed. To my knowledge there
is at least one dataset which fulfills these requirements, but alas I did not have access to
this data during the dissertation writing process. Regardless, I was still able to show
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robust linkages between personality and patterns of stability without this data. Shared
genetic pathway, or not, these relationships exist.
Finally, in a more fantastical request, there is plenty of evidence here which
shows the need for a new large-scale longitudinal dataset. This dataset would ideally
cover at least three generations (related or unrelated) starting at various points in their
lives. One generation should be preteenagers. Another generation should be 18-year-olds,
and the other generation should be a group between 35 and 50 years of age. The data
collected should cover the gamut of items discussed in here plus more. Deeper
understandings of how personality and other psychological traits interact with the
environment to shape political attitudes and general outlooks toward life will help to
advance our knowledge of the human development process. The processes shaping our
attitudes are more dynamic than our existing data allow for. Without a new dataset,
similar to the one I described above, it is hard to see how our knowledge of these
processes can move forward. There are a number of research questions and possibilities
that can be derived from the findings I presented. Again, this dissertation is the first step
in a long process of working to development a clearer understanding of attitudinal
development which is more rooted in the cognitive sciences and social psychology.

6.6 Conclusion
In my dissertation, I laid the groundwork for helping us to understand the process
of attitudinal development as a facet of biological, psychological, and sociological forces.
There is ample support for the inclusion of biologically and psychologically informed
variables throughout my analyses. These mechanisms are as important as age and
sociological factors to our understanding of attitudinal stability throughout the lifespan.
People do not readily abandon their attitudes, but some people are more stable than
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others. The increase and decrease in attitudinal stability is predicted by numerous
elements, and to ignore one set of elements in favor of another set, does a disservice to
our understanding of the human condition. To further this understanding, social scientists
from all disciplines should band together as a cross-disciplinary unit. Figuring out these
phenomena can help political science understand political attitudes, but it can also help
sociologists, psychologists, economists, and others answer questions pertinent to their
field.
The full examination of these phenomena must be cross-disciplinary because it is
clear the antecedents of these phenomena come from every direction. Microeconomic
effects, of importance to economists, shape economic policies. Prosocial behaviors, of
interest to social psychologists and clinical psychologists studying things like Autism
Spectrum Disorder, make people less likely to shift their attitudes. Familial role
acquisition, of interest to sociologists and family researchers, shapes social issue
attitudes. In all, there is much to be gained by working together on a new large-scale
endeavor to answer all of the questions I have laid out here and more.
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Endnotes
Items included in the Total Wilson-Patterson Change scale are: Global Warming, XRated Movies, Medicare, Legalize Marijuana, Legalized Abortion, Subsidized Abortion,
Gay Marriage, Nuclear Power Plants, Iraq War, Aboriginal Land Rights, Stem Cell
Research, Premarital Cohabitation, Women in Combat, Unions, Reclaimed Water,
Evolution, Euthanasia, Stricter Immigration, Education Spending, Aboriginal
Intervention, Military Spending, Foreign Trained Doctors, and War in Afghanistan.
Items included in the Social Wilson-Patterson Change scale are: X-Rated Movies,
Legalize Marijuana, Subsidized Abortion, Gay Marriage, Stem Cell Research, Premarital
Cohabitation, Women in Combat, Evolution, and Euthanasia.
Items included in the Economic Wilson-Patterson Change scale are: Global Warming,
Medicare, Nuclear Power Plants, Unions, Reclaimed Water, Education Spending,
Military Spending.
i

Ten items were used to measure openness (α = .77, M = 27.38, SD = 4.89): I see myself
as someone who is original, comes up with new ideas; I see myself as someone who is
curious about many different things; I see myself as someone who is ingenious, a deep
thinker; I see myself as someone who has an active imagination; I see myself as someone
who is inventive; I see myself as someone who values artistic, aesthetic experiences; I see
myself as someone who prefers work that is routine (reverse-coded); I see myself as
someone who likes to reflect and play with ideas; I see myself as someone who has few
artistic interests (reverse-coded).
Nine items were used to measure conscientiousness: (α = .81, M = 32.81, SD = 4.32): I
see myself as someone who does a thorough job; I see myself as someone who can be
somewhat careless (reverse-coded); I see myself as someone who is a reliable worker; I
see myself as someone who tends to be disorganized; I see myself as someone who tends
to be lazy (reverse-coded); I see myself as someone who perseveres until the task is
finished; I see myself as someone who does things efficiently; I see myself as someone
who makes plans and follows through with them; I see myself as someone who is easily
distracted (reverse-coded).
Eight items were used to measure extraversion (α = .85, M = 26.78, SD = 4.42): I see
myself as someone who is talkative; I see myself as someone who is reserved (reversecoded); I see myself as someone who is full of energy; I see myself as someone who
generates a lot of enthusiasm; I see myself as someone who tends to be quiet (reversecoded); I see myself as someone who has an assertive personality; I see myself as
someone who is sometimes shy, inhibited (reverse-coded); I see myself as someone who
is outgoing and sociable.
Nine items were used to measure agreeableness (α = .83, M = 23.95, SD = 4.61): I see
myself as someone who finds faults in others (reverse-coded); I see myself as someone
who is helpful and unselfish with others; I see myself as someone who starts quarrels
with others (reverse-coded); I see myself as someone who has a forgiving nature; I see
myself as someone who is generally trusting; I see myself as someone who can be cold an
aloof (reverse-coded); I see myself as someone who is considerate and kind to almost
ii
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everyone; I see myself as someone who is sometimes rude to others (reverse-coded); I see
myself as someone who likes to cooperate with others.
Eight items were used to measure emotional stability (α = .78, M = 33.96, SD = 3.97): I
see myself as someone who is depressed, blue (reverse-coded); I see myself as someone
who is relaxed, handles stress well; I see myself as someone who can be tense (reversecoded); I see myself as someone who worries a lot (reverse-coded); I see myself as
someone who is emotionally stable, not easily upset; I see myself as someone who can be
moody (reverse-coded); I see myself as someone who remains calm in tense situations; I
see myself as someone who gets nervous easily.
iii

The eighteen EQ items (α = .80, M = 66.55, SD = 8.12): I can easily tell if someone
else wants to enter a conversation; I find it hard to know what to do in a social situation
(reverse coded); Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, so I tend not to bother
with them (reverse coded); I often find it difficult to judge if something is rude or polite
(reverse coded); In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughts rather than on
what my listener might be thinking (reverse coded); I can pick up quickly if someone
says one thing but means another; It is hard for me to see why some things upset people
so much(reverse coded); I find it easy to put myself in some else’s shoes; I am good at
predicting how someone else will feel; I am quick to spot when someone in a group is
feeling awkward or uncomfortable; If I say something that someone else is offended by, I
think that’s their problem, not mine (reverse coded); I can’t always see why someone
should have felt offended by a remark (reverse coded); Seeing people cry doesn’t really
upset me (reverse coded); I don’t tend to find social situations confusing; Other people
tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what they are thinking; If I
see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to them to make an effort to join in (reverse
coded); I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively; I don’t
consciously work out the rules of social situations.
iii
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Appendix
Key: MC=Move Conservative; ML=Move Liberal; SC=Stay Conservative; SL=Stay
Liberal; SM = Stay Moderate
A1: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): Ideology
SC
SL
MC
ML
SM
SC
0.000
0.165
0.000
0.024
0.811
SL
0.000
0.000
0.019
0.162
0.819
MC
0.173
0.000
0.000
0.036
0.791
ML
0.000
0.122
0.000
0.162
0.716
SM
0.096
0.074
0.068
0.013
0.750
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted.
A2: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): Party Identification
ML
SC
SL
MC
ML
0.024
0.236
0.000
0.740
SC
0.002
0.017
0.066
0.916
SL
0.011
0.028
0.003
0.959
MC
0.000
0.119
0.008
0.873
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted.
A3: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): Guaranteed Jobs
SC
ML
SC
0.050
0.950
ML
0.314
0.686
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted
A4: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): Marijuana Legalization
MC
SL
SM
SC
MC
0.304
0.053
0.000
0.643
SL
0.064
0.012
0.000
0.924
SM
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.996
SC
0.000
0.000
0.016
0.984
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted
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A5: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): Minority Assistance
ML
SC
SC
SL
ML
0.340
0.000
0.144
0.515
SC
0.010
0.059
0.062
0.869
SL
0.000
0.363
0.117
0.520
MC
0.020
0.233
0.032
0.715
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted
A6: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): Rights of the Accused
SL
MC
ML
SC
SL
0.169
0.043
0.001
0.787
MC
0.039
0.016
0.074
0.871
ML
0.106
0.219
0.101
0.574
SC
0.000
0.248
0.018
0.734
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted
A7: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): Women’s Role in Society
SM
ML
SL
MC
SM
0.000
0.003
0.014
0.984
ML
0.007
0.340
0.000
0.652
SL
0.001
0.024
0.000
0.975
MC
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.994
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted
Key: MI=Move Intolerant; MT=Move Tolerant; SI=Stay Intolerant; ST=Stay Tolerant;
SA=Stay Ambivalent
A8: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): African-American Feeling Thermometer
MI
MT
SA
ST
SI
MI
0.000
0.061
0.000
0.000
0.939
MT
0.000
0.265
0.175
0.005
0.554
SA
0.000
0.011
0.030
0.001
0.958
ST
0.000
0.044
0.135
0.000
0.821
SI
0.003
0.080
0.233
0.000
0.684
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted
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A9: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row) by
Latent Class (Column): White-American Feeling Thermometer
MI
ST
SA
MT
MI
0.083
0.043
0.000
0.874
ST
0.040
0.014
0.018
0.927
SA
0.031
0.020
0.038
0.911
MT
0.000
0.083
0.134
0.783
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted
A10: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row)
by Latent Class (Column): Labor Unions Feeling Thermometer
SA
ST
SI
MI
SA
0.038
0.065
0.02
0.896
ST
0.265
0.000
0.000
0.735
SI
0.244
0.000
0.022
0.734
MI
0.111
0.000
0.300
0.589
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted
A11: Classification Probabilities for Most Likely Latent Class Membership (Row)
by Latent Class (Column): Big Business Feeling Thermometer
ST
SA
ST
0.284
0.716
SA
0.162
0.838
Note: Highest classification probabilities highlighted

